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Health expenditures as a share of GDP have more than tripled over the last half century. A common
conjecture is that this is primarily a consequence of rising real per capita income, which more than
doubled over the same period. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by instrumenting for local
area income with time-series variation in global oil prices between 1970 and 1990 interacted with
cross-sectional variation in the oil reserves across different areas of the Southern United States. This
strategy enables us to capture both the partial equilibrium and the local general equilibrium effects
of an increase in income on health expenditures. Our central estimate is an income elasticity of 0.7,
with an elasticity of 1.1 as the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval. Point estimates from
alternative specifications fall on both sides of our central estimate, but are almost always less than
1. We also present evidence suggesting that there are unlikely to be substantial national or global general
equilibrium effects of rising income on health spending, for example through induced innovation.
Our overall reading of the evidence is that rising income is unlikely to be a major driver of the rising





















The dramatic rise in health care expenditures is one of the notable economic trends of the
postwar era. As seen in Figure 1, health care expenditure as a share of GDP in the United
States has more than tripled over the last half century, from 5 percent in 1960 to 16 percent
in 2005 (CMS, 2006). A common conjecture is that the rise in the share of income spent on
health care expenditures is a direct, or at least a natural, consequence of the secular increase
in living standards￿ because health care is a ￿luxury good￿ .1 The Economist magazine stated
this as a ￿conventional wisdom￿in 1993, writing:
￿As with luxury goods, health spending tends to rise disproportionately as
countries become richer.￿(quoted in Blomqvist and Carter, 1997, p. 27).
This view has recently been forcefully articulated by Hall and Jones (2007). They argue
that the optimal share of spending on health increases as incomes rise, since spending money on
life extension allows individuals to escape diminishing marginal utility of consumption within a
period. The Hall-Jones view also receives indirect support from the very high estimates of the
value of life and value of health provided by Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy and Topel (2003,
2006). The fact that most other OECD countries have also experienced substantial growth
in their health sector over the last half century (OECD, 2004) also makes the secular rise in
incomes a natural candidate to explain the rise in the health share of GDP in the United
States.
Understanding the extent to which the rise in the health share of GDP is a direct conse-
quence of the rise in living standards is important for several reasons. First, it enables a proper
accounting of the notable growth in the US (and OECD) health care sector over the last half
century. Second, it is necessary for forecasting how health care spending is likely to evolve
in coming years. Finally, it is a crucial ￿rst step towards an assessment of the optimality of
the growth of the health care sector. In particular, if health spending is strongly increasing in
income, so that rising income can explain most or all of the rising health share, it would be
more likely that the increasing share of GDP allocated to health is socially optimal.2
1Throughout we use the term ￿luxury good￿ to designate an empirical income elasticity greater than one
(and similarly ￿necessity￿refers to an elasticity less than one). This responsiveness to income may result from
preferences, policy or other factors.
2Of course a large role for income would only be suggestive, not dispositive. A systematic analysis of social
optimality would also have to consider potential externalities in health provision and in health R&D, as well as
informational and institutional constraints in the health care market.
1The relationship between income and health spending is the subject of a voluminous em-
pirical literature. Remarkably, however, virtually all existing estimates are based on simple
correlations of income and health care spending, across individuals, across countries, or over
time. These correlations are consistent with income elasticities ranging from close to zero to
substantially above one.3 In light of the paucity of existing evidence, Hall and Jones (2007)
conclude their paper by stating that ￿Our model makes the strong prediction that if one looks
hard enough and carefully enough, one ought to be able to see income e⁄ects [with elasticities
above 1] in the micro data. Future empirical work will be needed to judge this prediction.￿
Our objective is to provide causal estimates of the e⁄ect of income on aggregate health
spending. There are (at least) two important challenges in this exercise. The ￿rst is that
income and health co-vary at the individual or regional level for a variety of reasons. Therefore,
simple correlations are unlikely to reveal the causal e⁄ect of income on health spending.
A second challenge is that an investigation of the role that rising income plays in the growth
of the health care sector requires incorporating the general equilibrium e⁄ects of income on
health spending. Partial and general equilibrium income elasticities may di⁄er for a variety of
reasons. For example, the general equilibrium e⁄ect of rising income may be larger than the
partial equilibrium e⁄ect if an increase in the demand for health care from a community (a
￿general equilibrium change￿ ) prompts changes in medical practices, including the adoption
(and possibly development) of new technologies.4 Alternatively, if the supply of health care is
less than perfectly elastic and the price elasticity of demand for health care is greater than one,
the responsiveness of health care expenditures to an increase in income may be lower in general
equilibrium than in partial equilibrium. In addition, changes in income may also a⁄ect health
care policy through a variety of political economy channels, either magnifying or curtailing
the direct e⁄ect of income on health expenditures. Many of the potential general equilibrium
e⁄ects are ￿local￿in the sense that they result from changes in incomes in a particular region or
local economy. These e⁄ects can be detected by looking at the response of health spending to
income in the local economy. In addition, there may also exist national or even global general
equilibrium e⁄ects, which will be harder to detect empirically.
3OECD (2006) provides a recent survey of the large empirical literature on the correlation between income
and health spending (see particularly Annex 2B). The cross-sectional relationship across individuals between
income and health spending tends to be small or negative (e.g., Newhouse and Phelps 1976). In contrast, cross-
country analysis tends to suggest income elasticities greater than 1 (e.g., Newhouse 1977, Gerdtham and Jonsson
2000), as do time-series analyses of the relationship between income growth and growth in health spending for
individual countries (e.g., Fogel 1999).
4Finkelstein (2007), for example, argues that, for such reasons, the general equilibrium e⁄ect of health
insurance coverage on health spending is larger than the partial equilibrium e⁄ect.
2We confront both of these challenges. By exploiting potentially exogenous variation in
local area incomes, we attempt to estimate causal elasticities that incorporate local general
equilibrium e⁄ects. On the basis of our estimates and additional evidence, we also argue below
that national or global general equilibrium e⁄ects are unlikely to be signi￿cant in this instance.
Our strategy is to exploit the time-series variation in global oil prices between 1970 and
1990, which impacted incomes di⁄erentially across di⁄erent parts of the (Southern) United
States that vary in the oil intensity of the local economy. In our baseline speci￿cation we
approximate local economies by Economic Sub Regions (ESRs), which consist of groups of
counties within a state that have strong economic ties. We focus on the South of the United
States to increase the comparability of the ESRs, in particular to minimize the likelihood of
di⁄erential trends in health care expenditure driven by other factors. Our empirical strategy
exploits the interaction between global oil prices and ESR-level importance of oil in the economy
as an instrument for income. Our main proxy for the importance of oil is the size of pre-existing
oil reserves in an ESR. The identifying assumption is that the interaction between global oil
price changes and local oil reserves should have no e⁄ect on changes in the demand for health
care, except through income. We provide several pieces of evidence that are supportive of the
validity of this identifying assumption. Using this instrumental-variable strategy we estimate
the elasticity of health expenditures with respect to income. Because our instrument impacts
incomes at the ESR level (rather than individual income), our estimates correspond to local
general equilibrium e⁄ects of income changes.5
Our baseline estimate is a statistically signi￿cant elasticity of ESR hospital spending with
respect to ESR income of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21). This point estimate suggests that
rising income would be associated with a modest decline in the health share of GDP. Perhaps
more informatively, the upper end of our 95 percent con￿dence interval allows us to reject the
hypothesis that rising real income explains more than 0.5 percentage points of the 11 percentage
point increase in the health share of US GDP between 1960 and 2005. Point estimates of the
income elasticity from a wide range of alternative speci￿cations fall on both sides of our baseline
estimate, but are almost always less than 1.
We note at the outset (and explore in greater depth in the paper) two potentially important
caveats to our conclusions. The ￿rst caveat is that our empirical work focuses primarily
on hospital expenditures from the American Hospital Association data (rather than on total
health expenditures). Hospital spending is the single largest component of total health care
5We also present results at the state rather than ESR level. This reduces our cross-sectional variation in oil
intensity but alllows us to capture general equilibrium e⁄ects at a higher level of geography than the ESR. The
results are similar.
3spending, and the time-series evidence in Figure 1 suggests that hospital and non-hospital
components of health care have grown proportionally over the last half century. If income
elasticities were substantially higher for the non-hospital components of health expenditures,
and if the rise in income over this time period were the major driver of the increase in health
expenditures, we should (all else equal) see a decline in the hospital share of total health
expenditures. This suggests that income elasticities of hospital and non-hospital components
of health expenditures should be similar. We also draw on additional data sources to provide
suggestive empirical evidence that the income elasticities of hospital expenditures and overall
health expenditures are similar. This evidence bolsters our belief that our elasticity estimates
for hospital spending are likely to be representative of those for total health expenditures.
A second potentially important caveat is that our strategy estimates local general equi-
librium e⁄ects, but will not capture any global or national general equilibrium e⁄ects. Of
particular concern is that if the growth of the health care market resulting from the rise in
global incomes induced more innovation, our estimates would not incorporate the implications
of these induced innovations on health expenditures. Nevertheless, we believe that signi￿-
cantly larger elasticities resulting from these induced innovation general equilibrium e⁄ects are
unlikely for two reasons. First, the same induced innovation e⁄ects working at the national
or global level should manifest themselves as increased technology adoption or entry of new
hospitals at the local (ESR) level. However, we ￿nd no statistically or substantively signi￿cant
e⁄ects of local income on hospital entry or on various measures of technology adoption at the
ESR level. In this light, a signi￿cant global induced innovation e⁄ect seems unlikely. Second,
technological change should be more rapid for sectors that are expanding faster than others
(e.g., Acemoglu, 2002, Acemoglu and Linn, 2004). Since health care appears to have an income
elasticity less than one, induced innovations should relatively favor the non-health sectors that
have an income elasticity above one.6
Relatedly, our estimates also leave out any general equilibrium e⁄ects of rising income
operating through a national policy response. Nevertheless, as we discuss in more detail below,
since a signi￿cant portion of health care policy is determined at the sub-national level, much
of the impact of rising income on health care policy should be incorporated in our estimates.
We also present some suggestive evidence that any national policy responses not captured by
our analysis are likely to be quantitatively small.
6Note that this argument does not imply that there are no induced innovation e⁄ects in health care. In fact,
the evidence in Acemoglu and Linn (2004) shows that the introduction of new drugs for di⁄erent age groups
is strongly responsive to changes in the relative (expected) market sizes. However, these results are silent on
whether total pharmaceutical￿ or medical￿ innovation responds to rising incomes; in fact, they suggest that
if rising incomes increase the relative market sizes of other sectors more than that of health care, induced
innovations should be relatively directed towards these other sectors.
4A ￿nal point that warrants emphasis at the outset is that our empirical strategy estimates
the e⁄ect of rising incomes on health care spending in the recent US context. This empirical
relationship is undoubtedly partly shaped by several speci￿c institutional features of the US
health care system. Our evidence does not therefore directly address the question of whether
health care is a ￿luxury good￿ in households￿utility function as hypothesized by Hall and
Jones (2007).
To our knowledge, our paper represents the ￿rst empirical attempt to estimate the causal
general equilibrium income elasticity of health spending.7 Indeed, we are only aware of two
prior studies that attempt to estimate the ￿causal e⁄ect￿of income on health spending; both
estimate the partial equilibrium e⁄ect of income on own health spending. Moran and Simon
(2006) use the Social Security notch cohort to examine the e⁄ect of plausibly exogenous varia-
tion in an elderly individual￿ s income on the elderly￿ s prescription drug use; they estimate an
elasticity of drug use with respect to income of above one. The Rand Health Insurance Exper-
iment ￿nds that a small, unanticipated, temporary increase in own income has no signi￿cant
impact on own health expenditures or utilization (Newhouse et al., 1993, p. 78).8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical strategy and
data. Section 3 shows the ￿rst-stage relationship between ESR income and our instrument, and
presents our instrumental variable estimates of the income elasticity of hospital expenditures
and their components. Section 4 discusses the implications of our elasticity estimate for the
role of rising income in explaining the rise in the health share of GDP in the United States;
it also discusses in some depth some of the most salient potential threats to extrapolating
from our estimates in this manner. Section 5 explores the robustness of our instrumental-
variables estimates along a number of dimensions and examines the validity of our identifying
assumption. Section 6 concludes.
7Our empirical strategy is related to that used by Michaels (2007) to estimate the long-run consequences
of resource-based specialization, and to those in Buckley (2003) and Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005).
Michaels also exploits variation in oil abundance across county groups within the US South and studies the
consequences of the availability of greater oil resources on changes in the sectoral composition of employment
and in education. Buckley (2003) exploited the same source of variation within Texas to investigate the e⁄ect
of income on marriage and divorce. Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005) use a similar strategy focusing the
coal boom and bust. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) investigate the impact of changes in oil prices on sectoral
job creation and job destruction. Kilian (2008) provides a review of the literature on the economic e⁄ects of
energy price shocks on a variety of di⁄erent sectors and macroeconomic aggregates. None of these papers study
the e⁄ect of income on the health care sector.
8These results are from the so-called Super Participation Incentive in which a sub-sample of families were
given an unanticipated, small (a maximum of $250 in the mid 1970s) additional lump sum payment for one
year in the penultimate year of the experiment. Note that this sub-experiment was not designed to estimate
the income elasticity of demand for health care but rather to test whether the income side payments made to
families as part of the experimental design (whose focus was to estimate the e⁄ect of cost sharing) impacted
utilization.
52 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.1 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to instrument for income in di⁄erent geographic areas (approximating
local economies) with time-series variation in oil prices interacted with cross-sectional variation
in the oil intensity of the di⁄erent local economies. We then examine the relationship between
the resulting changes in income and changes in health care spending using panel data on
area-level health care spending. The structural relationship of interest is modeled as:
loghjt = ￿j + ￿t+￿ logyjt + XT
jt￿ + "jt; (1)
where hjt is health care expenditures in area j and year t, yjt denotes income in area j in year
t, and Xjt denotes a vector of other covariates that are included in some of our speci￿cations
(and XT
jt denotes its transpose). In our baseline speci￿cation, there are no Xjts and hjt is
measured by hospital expenditures. The ￿js are area ￿xed e⁄ects measuring any time-invariant
di⁄erences across the di⁄erent geographic areas. The ￿ts are year ￿xed e⁄ects, capturing any
common (proportional) changes in health care spending each year. For simplicity, equation (1)
assumes a linear form and constant proportional e⁄ects of income on health expenditure.9
The simplest strategy would be to estimate ￿ in equation (1) using ordinary least squares
(OLS). However, OLS estimates of ￿ are likely to be biased. Moreover, the sign of the bias is
a priori ambiguous. For example, if income is positively correlated with (unobserved) health
and healthier areas have lower health care expenditures, the OLS estimates would be biased
downwards. If, on the other hand, income is positively correlated with insurance coverage and
insurance encourages increased health care spending, OLS estimates would be biased upwards.
Our empirical strategy attempts to isolate potentially-exogenous sources of variation in
local area income, yjt. We instrument for changes in area income by exploiting the di⁄erential
impact of (global) changes in oil prices across areas of the country in which oil plays a more or
less signi￿cant role in the local economy. In particular, we instrument for logyjt in equation
(1) with the following ￿rst-stage regression:
logyjt = ￿0
j + ￿0
t + ￿(logpt￿1 ￿ Ij) + XT
jt￿0+ujt; (2)
where pt￿1 is the global spot oil price in the previous year, and Ij is a (time-invariant) measure
of the role of oil in the local economy. The ￿0
js and ￿0
ts are de￿ned similarly to the ￿js and
9The speci￿cation with the dependent variable, hospital expenditures, in logs rather than in levels is attractive
both because the distribution of hospital expenditures across areas is highly right skewed (see Figure 4b below)
and because it implies that year ￿xed e⁄ects correspond to constant proportional (rather than constant level)
changes in health spending across all areas.
6￿ts in equation (1). In our baseline speci￿cations, Ij will be proxied by the total amount of oil
reserves in area j. Throughout, we use oil prices dated t ￿ 1 in the regression for income at
time t to allow for a lag in the translation of oil price changes into income changes. We show in
Section 5 that the estimates and implied elasticities are similar when we instead use oil prices
at time t. The year ￿xed e⁄ects in both the ￿rst and second stage will capture any common
(proportional) e⁄ects of oil price changes on area income and health care expenditures that
are independent of the role of oil in the local economy, which may be operating, for example,
through the e⁄ects of oil prices on costs of living or production.
Our identifying assumption is that, absent oil price changes, health expenditures in areas
with di⁄erent oil reserves would have grown at similar rates. This is reasonable since both global
oil prices and the location of oil reserves are not a⁄ected by, and should not be correlated with,
changes in an area￿ s demand for health care. Naturally, areas with di⁄erent amounts of oil
reserves may di⁄er in ways that could a⁄ect health expenditures. Any such di⁄erences that are
time-invariant will be captured by the area ￿xed e⁄ects (the ￿js and ￿0
js) in equations (1) and
(2). Only di⁄erential trends in health expenditures across these areas would be a threat to the
validity of our instrumental-variables strategy. As a basic step to increase comparability across
areas and to limit potential di⁄erential trends, our baseline analysis focuses on the Southern
United States￿ which contains about 50% of the oil in the United States (Oil and Gas Journal
Data Book, 2000). We show in the next subsection that areas of the Southern United States
that di⁄er in terms of the role of oil in the local economy (Ij in (1) and (2)) have similar levels
of income and hospital expenditures at the start of our sample period (when oil prices had
been relatively constant for at least 20 years). More importantly, in Section 5, we provide a
variety of evidence to support our identifying assumption that there were no major di⁄erential
trends in health expenditures across local economies correlated with their oil intensity.
Our baseline speci￿cation focuses on the period 1970-1990, which encompasses the major
oil boom and bust, and uses Economic Sub Regions (ESRs) as our geographic units (local
economies). We construct our ESRs by splitting the Economic Sub Regions produced by the
Census (￿Census ESRs￿ ) so that our ESRs do not straddle state boundaries. Census ESRs
are commonly used geographic aggregations that were last revised for the 1970 Census; they
consist of groupings of State Economic Areas (SEAs).10 There are 247 ESRs in the United
States overall, and 99 in our sample of 16 Southern states.11 We discuss below the results of
10ESRs frequently cross state boundaries. In contrast, SEAs do not cross state boundaries and are de￿ned
on the basis of a combination of demographic, economic, agricultural, topographic and natural resource con-
siderations. In metropolitan areas, SEAs are based on standard metropolitan areas (SMSAs); for SMSAs that
straddle two or more states, each part becomes a separate SEA.
11Our baseline sample is 2065 observations instead of 99￿21=2079 observations because of four ESR-years of
missing hospital data and because Washington D.C. does not appear in the hospital data until 1980. Restricting
7analyses at di⁄erent levels of aggregation (in particular, state) and also explore the implications
of expanding the analysis to include longer time periods and other parts of the United States.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Estimation of equations (1) and (2) requires time-series data on oil prices, cross-sectional data
on the oil intensity of the local economy, panel data on the income in each area, and panel
data on health expenditures in each area. We brie￿ y describe the construction of our main
data series here. Table 1a provides summary statistics on some of our main variables.
Oil prices We measure oil prices by the average annual spot oil price from the West Texas
Intermediate series.12 Figure 2 shows the time series of average annual spot oil prices from
1950 to 2005. We focus primarily on the period 1970-1990, as these two decades encompass
the major oil boom and bust. Oil prices rose dramatically over the 1970s from $3.35 per barrel
in 1970 to a high of $37.38 per barrel in 1980. This oil boom was followed by an oil bust; oil
prices declined starting in 1980 to a trough of $15.04 per barrel in 1986. We discuss below
the e⁄ects of extending the analysis to include the later oil boom that began at the end of the
1990s as well as the results of falsi￿cation exercises during the pre-boom 1950s and 1960s.
Oil price shocks appear to be permanent. Using the time-series data shown in Figure 2,
a regression of the log oil price at time t on its one year lag produces a coe¢ cient of 1.009
(standard error = 0.043). Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests are reported in Appendix
Table A1, which all fail to reject the null hypothesis that log oil prices follow a unit root.13
This evidence suggests that our empirical strategy will be informative about the e⁄ects of
permanent (rather than transitory) changes in income on health care expenditures.
Oil intensity Our primary measure of the oil intensity of area j is an estimate of the total oil
reserves in that area (since discovery). We draw on data from the 2000 Edition of the Oil and
Gas Journal Data Book, which includes information on all 306 oil wells in the United States
of more than 100 million barrels in total size. Total oil reserves are calculated as estimated
remaining reserves plus total cumulative oil production as of 1998; they are thus not a⁄ected
by the prior intensity of oil extraction in the area. Throughout, we refer to these as ￿large￿
oil wells. Our baseline analysis is limited to the Southern United States, which contains 161 of
the sample to include only ESRs that appear in all years does not a⁄ect results.
12These data are available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE/downloaddata?
cid=98.
13Kline (2008) conducts a more detailed analysis of the time-series behavior of oil prices and concludes that
oil prices are ￿well approximated by a pure random walk￿ . See also Hamilton (2008) for a similar conclusion.
8the 306 large oil wells in the United States and 51% of the total oil reserves of these oil wells.14
Figure 3 shows the cross-sectional variation in oil reserves across di⁄erent areas of the South.
It indicates that the importance of oil to the local economy varies substantially across di⁄erent
areas of the South, including substantial within state variation. For example, approximately
70 percent (69 out of 99) of the ESRs in the Southern United States have no large oil wells.
Conditional on having a large oil well, the standard deviation in oil reserves across ESRs in
the Southern US is more than 2500 million barrels (relative to a mean reserve conditional on
having any reserves of 1700 million barrels). As a result of this variation, as we shall see,
di⁄erent areas experienced di⁄erential changes in income in response to changing oil prices;
this is the basis of our ￿rst stage.
In some of our analyses we also draw on data from the 1970 Census on the mining share
of employment in 1970 to help measure oil intensity of an area. The mining share includes
all workers in oil mining, natural gas and coal mining (it is not available separately for oil
mining).15
Area income Our primary data on ESR income comes from aggregating up county-level
annual payroll (for all establishments) from the County Business Patterns (CBP).16 We also
obtain ESR-level employment data from the CBP in the same manner. The CBP data are
attractive for our purposes because of their level of disaggregation, enabling us to construct
ESR-level measures of income. Figure 4a provides a histogram of the logarithm (log) of income
from the CBP across ESRs. The distribution of log income appears to be well approximated
by a normal distribution.
A potential drawback of these data is that they do not include capital income. To investigate
whether the exclusion of capital income has a systematic e⁄ect on our results, we also repeat
our analysis at the state level using annual data on gross state product (GSP), which includes
both labor and capital income. We also use industry-speci￿c GSP estimates as a dependent
14According to the 2000 Edition of the Oil and Gas Data Book, there is only one large well in the South that
is listed as having been discovered after 1970 (Giddings, TX in 1971). Excluding this well has no e⁄ect on our
results. There are also 60 (out of the 306) oil wells that are located o⁄-shore and thus were not assigned to any
county. These o⁄-shore wells account for 12% of the oil reserves in the data.
15Mining share of employment is de￿ned based on the 1970 Census of Population (Volume 1: Characteristics
of the Population, Table 123, Parts 2-9 & 11-52).
16The CBP is an annual establishment survey of all establishments in the Business Register at the Census
Bureau. The CBP data are available on-line at the Geospatial & Statistical Data Center at the University of
Virginia for the years 1977 through 1997 (http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/cbp/county.
html) and at the U.S. Census Bureau for the years 1998 through 2006 (http://censtats.census.gov/cbpnaic/
cbpnaic.shtml). Earlier years were hand-entered from bound volumes available at the MIT Library Storage
Annex. For more information on these data see http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpmethodology.
htm).
9variable to provide comparative estimates of income elasticities in di⁄erent industries.17
Area health spending Our primary data on area health spending are obtained by aggre-
gating up hospital level data from the American Hospital Association￿ s (AHA) annual census
of all US hospitals. We use these data to construct our main dependent variable, total hospital
expenditures in area j and year t. Figure 4b shows a histogram of the logarithm of hospital
spending from the AHA, which also has the standard shape of a normally-distributed variable.
The AHA data also contain other measures of hospital activity, which we use below to
investigate which components of health expenditure respond to the rise in income and to in-
vestigate the impact of rising income on hospital technology adoption. Speci￿cally, the AHA
data contain total hospital expenditures, payroll expenditures, full time equivalent employ-
ment, admissions, inpatient days, beds, and a series of binary indicator variables for whether
the hospital has a variety of di⁄erent technologies. For about three quarters of the years, we
also have information on the levels of full-time equivalent employment of two types of nurses in
the data: Registered Nurses (RNs) and Licensed Practitioner Nurses (LPNs), which together
constitute about 20% of total hospital employment. RNs are considerably more skilled than
LPNs and we use the ratio of RNs to RNs and LPNs combined as a proxy for the skill mix.18
There are three key advantages of the AHA data. First, they are extremely high quality.
Relatedly, they appear to be unique among annual sub-national data on health expenditures
from our time period in that they are constructed independently each year, and therefore do
not rely on some degree of interpolation between years. Second, they allow us to conduct our
analysis at a level of aggregation below the state and thus to exploit the substantial within-
state variation in oil intensity shown in Figure 3a. Third, they allow us to measure other
components of health care activity. In particular, using these data we can measure hospital
technology adoption decisions and thereby investigate potential global general equilibrium
e⁄ects through induced innovation.
The major drawback of the AHA data is that they do not contain information on non-
hospital components of health expenditures. To investigate whether the focus on hospital
spending may lead to biased estimates of the income elasticity of total health expenditures,
we use data from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which produces state-
level estimates of total personal health care expenditures and its components, although only
for a subset of our study years (Levit, 1982, 1985).19 In addition, we also examine decadal
17GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/).
18RN certi￿cation requires about twice as many years of training as LPN certi￿cation and RNs are paid
substantially higher hourly wages (see Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008).
19As we discuss in more detail in Section 4 below, the HCFA data are constructed partly based on in-
10state-level Census data on the earnings of various groups of health care providers.
Population To investigate the extent of migration in response to our income variation, we
use annual data on total area population and on area population by ￿ve year age groups from
the Current Population Reports (CPR). Crucially, for our purposes, population is not inter-
polated between censuses but rather is imputed annually based on a variety of administrative
data sources including data on births, deaths, school enrollment, and tax returns (US Census
Bureau, various states and years, and Siegal, 2002).20
Finally, to gauge the relative intensity of hospital use among individuals of di⁄erent age
groups, we use data on the age pro￿le of hospital use constructed from the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS), which we pool between 1973 and 1991.
Comparison across areas with di⁄erent oil intensity Table 1b examines whether there
are signi￿cant di⁄erences in income and various measures of hospital activity in 1970 across
ESRs with di⁄erent levels of oil reserves. We look at this relationship in our baseline sample of
the 16 Southern United States. Columns 3 and 4 of this table show that there is no statistically
or economically signi￿cant relationship between oil reserves and any (or all) of population,
total employment, hospital expenditures, hospital beds and total income. In each case, the
association with oil reserves is statistically indistinguishable from zero and the magnitude of
variation is small (one standard deviation change in oil reserve is associated with only about one
tenth of one standard deviation change in each of these variables). This o⁄ers some preliminary
support for our exclusion restriction that, absent the oil price changes in the 1970s and 1980s,
ESRs with di⁄erent levels of oil reserves would have been on similar trends in terms of their
hospital expenditures and utilization. Section 5 provides a more systematic investigation of
the validity of our exclusion restriction.
terpolation between years, which is an important caveat for regression analysis based on these data. Data
from 1972 and 1976-1978 were obtained from Levit (1982, 1985). Data for 1980-1990 were obtained from the
Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services on-line at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/05_
NationalHealthAccountsStateHealthAccountsResidence.asp#TopOfPage. The data include total health ex-
penditures and expenditures on the following components (which sum to the total): Hospital Care, Physicians￿
Services, Dentists￿Services, Drugs and Other Medical Nondurables, Eyeglasses and Appliances, Nursing Home
Care, and Other Health Services (which include Home Health Care, Other Professional Services, and Other
Personal Services).




Table 2 shows the relationship between ESR income and our instrument. The ￿rst column
shows the results from estimating equation (2). In this and all subsequent estimates, we allow
for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each state.21 The results in column 1 indicate
a positive and strong ￿rst stage: ESRs with greater oil reserves experience greater changes in
income in response to oil price changes than areas with less oil. The F-statistic is 18.74. We
defer a discussion of the magnitude of the ￿rst stage until a little later in this section.
To examine the sources of the increase in income, column 2 re-estimates the ￿rst-stage
equation (2) using log area employment on the left-hand side instead of log area income. The
results indicate that areas with more oil also experience greater change in employment when
oil prices change. The coe¢ cient on our instrument, ￿, is of approximately the same magnitude
in columns 1 and 2, suggesting that all (or most) of the changes in income associated with
oil price movements across areas with di⁄erent levels of oil reserves may be due to changes in
employment at constant wages. This is consistent with our prior expectations that oil workers
should be close substitutes to other workers and have a relatively elastic labor supply in the
local labor market. It is also consistent with the stylized fact that labor income changes at
short-run frequencies (e.g., over the business cycle) are largely driven by employment changes,
with little movements in wage per worker.22 In contrast to our source of income variation,
about half of the growth in income between 1960 to 2005 is due to increased employment, while
the other half is due to increased wages per employee (US Census Bureau, 2008). In Section
4, we discuss the possible implications of extrapolating from our income changes to the e⁄ects
of the secular increase in incomes in the US economy.
The impact of our instrument on employment and existing evidence on migration responses
to local economic conditions (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992) suggest that our instrument
may also a⁄ect area population. Any increase in population in high oil areas relative to low oil
areas may increase health expenditures directly, potentially over-stating the e⁄ect of increased
income on hospital spending among a (constant) population. Column 3 explores this issue by
re-estimating equation (2) with log population as the new dependent variable. The results
indicate that our instrument also predicts population, so that part of the increase in area
income we estimate re￿ ects increases in area population; a comparison of columns 2 and 3
21Because of concerns of the small sample properties of clustering with only 16 states, we experimented with
alternative small sample corrections, as well as alternative strategies to correct for potential serial correlation.
The alternative procedures produce similar results, and are discussed in Section 5.
22See, for example, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995). This does not imply that the wage per e¢ ciency unit
of labor is constant, since there may be composition e⁄ects (see, Solon, Barsky and Parker, 1994).
12suggests that about one third of the e⁄ect of the instrument on employment can be accounted
for by its e⁄ects on population.
A natural solution is to convert both income (our endogenous right-hand side variable) and
hospital expenditures (our dependent variable of interest) into per capita terms, so that the
structural equation focuses on the impact of income per capita on hospital spending per capita
(the same instrument now used for income per capita in the ￿rst stage). The ￿rst-stage results
from estimating equation (2) with log income per capita on the left-hand side are shown in
column 4. Consistent with a comparison of columns 1 and 3, the per-capita speci￿cation shows
a statistically signi￿cant but smaller ￿rst-stage e⁄ect than unadjusted speci￿cation in column
1. In particular, the ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient is smaller than that in column 1 by 5 log points or
by about 40 percent.
While the per capita speci￿cation is natural, it may in turn under-state the e⁄ect of in-
creased income on hospital spending because the population changes associated with our in-
strument are from disproportionately low users of hospital care. This can be seen in columns
5 and 6, in which we estimate equation (2) using as the dependent variable the log of the total
population under 55 and the log of the total population 55 and over, respectively. The results
indicate that the population response to our instrument is concentrated among the non-elderly
(those under 55). In fact, it appears that the population response is concentrated among those
younger than 45 (not shown in Table 2 to save space). Younger individuals consume dispro-
portionately lower amounts of hospital care than the elderly. To illustrate this, Figure 5 shows
the average annual number of hospital days for individuals in ￿ve-year age brackets estimated
from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), pooled between 1973 and 1991. The under
55 average 0.6 hospital days per year, while individuals aged 55 and older average 2.3 hospital
days per year. As a result, even though the 55 and older are only 23% of the population, they
consume 38% of hospital days.
To obtain more accurate estimates of the impact of rising incomes on health expenditures
(and, if anything, to err on the side of over-estimating, rather than under-estimating, income
elasticities), in our baseline analysis we correct for the changes in the composition of the
population rather than simply using per capita estimates. In particular, we construct a measure
of ￿hospital utilization weighted population￿in area j in year t, denoted by HUWPjt. This
measure is computed as the inner product of the vector of populations in each ￿ve year age bin
in area j and year t (popajt) with our estimate of the national average of hospital days used




popajt ￿ hospdaysa (3)
13Our preferred speci￿cation adjusts (i.e., divides) income in both the structural equation
(1) and the ￿rst-stage equation (2) and hospital expenditures in the structural equation (1) by
HUWPjt as constructed in equation (3). This leads to our baseline structural equation:
log~ hjt = ￿j + ￿t+￿ log ~ yjtjt + XT
jt￿+"jt; (4)
and our baseline ￿rst-stage equation:
log ~ yjt = ￿0
j + ￿0
t + ￿0(logpt￿1 ￿ Ij) + XT
jt￿0 + ujt; (5)








Intuitively, both income and hospital expenditures (or other outcomes) are adjusted for hospital-
use weighted population (HUWP) to capture any direct e⁄ect of our instrument on hospital-use
weighted population.
The estimates of the ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient, ￿0, from equation (5) are shown in column
7. Its magnitude lies (mechanically) in between the ￿rst-stage estimates without any migra-
tion adjustment (column 1) and with the per capita adjustment (column 4). In practice, the
magnitude is about one third of the way from the per capita adjustment to the unadjusted
speci￿cation. The IV estimate of the e⁄ect of income on hospital spending using the hospi-
tal utilization weighted population adjustment should therefore similarly lie in between the
unadjusted estimates and the per capita adjusted estimates (and we ￿nd below that it does).
In what follows, we take the estimates from equations (5) and (4), which correct for the age-
adjusted hospital utilization of the population, as our baseline/preferred speci￿cation. Because
even conditional on age migrants may be healthier than the general population, the estimate
of ￿ from (4) might understate the e⁄ects of income on health expenditures. We therefore
also report results without any adjustment for migration as well as results using the per capita
adjustment. One might consider the unadjusted estimates as an upper bound on the income
elasticity, and the per capita adjusted estimates are a lower bound (provided that the marginal
migrant into a high-oil area in response to an oil price increase is ￿healthier￿than the average
population in the area, which seems like a reasonable assumption).23 In practice, we will see
below that these ￿bounds￿on the income elasticity are relatively tight.
Finally, column 8 shows the HUWP-adjusted ￿rst stage but now aggregated to the state
level (rather than the ESR level as in column 7); the ￿rst stage is robust to aggregation to the
23This last presumption is both intuitive and consistent with the fact that migration is concentrated among
younger individuals (see Table 2).
14state level (F-statistic = 24.05).24
To gauge the magnitude of the ￿rst stage, we calculated that in our preferred speci￿cation
(column 7) the oil price change from 1970 to 1980 is associated with a 3.6 percent larger
increase in area income in areas with a one standard deviation larger amount of oil. The ￿rst
stage in our preferred speci￿cation has an F-statistic of 16.58.
3.2 Income Elasticity of Hospital Spending and Components
Table 3 presents our central estimates of the impact of income on hospital expenditures. Col-
umn 1 reports the OLS estimate of equation (4) in which both hospital expenditures and
income are adjusted for HUWP. The estimate of ￿ in (4) is -0.027 (standard error = 0.074).
This indicates that when income in an area increase by 10 percent, hospital expenditures fall by
about 0.3 percent. This relationship is statistically indistinguishable from zero. As previously
discussed, the OLS correlation between income and hospital spending may be biased in either
direction relative to the causal e⁄ect of income on hospital spending. Our subsequent analysis
suggests that in our setting the OLS estimate is downward biased.
Column 2 shows the results from the reduced form corresponding to (4) and (5) (without
covariates):
log~ hjt = ￿00
j + ￿00
t + ￿00(logpt￿1 ￿ Ij) + "00
jt: (6)
This reduced-form estimation shows a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between
our instrument and log hospital expenditures.
Column 3 presents our baseline IV estimate of equation (4). The estimated elasticity of
health expenditure with respect to income is 0.723, with a standard error of 0.214.25
Columns 4 and 5 show IV results without any population adjustment and with a per capita
population adjustment, respectively, to both hospital expenditures and income. As discussed
in Section 3.1, these estimates can be interpreted as upper and lower bounds on the income
elasticity of hospital spending. In both alternative speci￿cations the income elasticity remains
statistically signi￿cant and ranges between 0.665 and 0.801, suggesting that these bounds are
reasonably tight.
24Although the ￿rst stage is robust to aggregating up from ESR to state, it is not robust to dis-aggregating the
data to a lower level of aggregation than the ESR (not shown). For example, we explored analyses conducted at
the level of the State Economic Area (SEA); there are 194 SEAs in our sample of Southern States compared to
99 ESRs. The major concern with the SEAs is that some of them are closely linked to each other economically
and residentially, thus would not be experiencing independent income variation. In this case, we would expect
a signi￿cant amount of attenuation in the ￿rst stage. Consistent with this expectation, the ￿rst stage becomes
weaker, with an F-statistic of only 2.06 at the SEA level. As a result, we do not report IV estimates for lower
levels of aggregation.
25Since we have only one instrument and one endogenous right-hand side variable, the point estimate in the IV
speci￿cation can also be obtained by dividing the reduced-form estimate in column 2 by the ￿rst-stage estimate
from column 7 of Table 2.
15The last column of Table 3 reports the results from our baseline, HUWP-adjusted speci￿ca-
tion (from column 3) but now aggregated to the state level. We estimate an income elasticity
at the state level of 0.550 (standard error = 0.230). The point estimate at the state level
is similar to our estimate at the ESR level of 0.723 (see column 3). We provide a more de-
tailed discussion of state-level results in Section 4 but note here that, among other things, the
state-level estimates allow us to capture potential general equilibrium e⁄ects, such as political
economy e⁄ects, that may be more likely to occur at the level of the state than at the sub-state
ESR.
Table 4 investigates which components of hospital expenditures are a⁄ected by income
changes. It reports the results from IV estimation of equation (4) using di⁄erent hospital
outcomes as the dependent variable.26 Several interesting ￿ndings emerge. First, the results in
columns 1 and 2 suggest that the impact of income on hospital payroll expenditures (which are
about one half of total hospital expenditures) can explain all of the e⁄ect of income on total
hospital expenditures. There is no evidence in column 3 of an economically or statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect of income on hospital employment. This suggests that the increase in payroll
expenditures comes from a combination of an improvement in the quality of employees and/or
a bidding up of the wages of (quality-adjusted) employees.
Second, we ￿nd evidence of economically and statistically signi￿cant skill upgrading asso-
ciated with increased income. Column 4 shows an increase in the skill composition of employ-
ment, proxied by the ratio of skilled nurses (RNs) to all RNs and LPNs.27 This does not rule
out wage (price) e⁄ects, but suggests that at least some of the increase in payroll expenditures
in column 2 comes from quality improvements. More importantly, evidence of skill upgrading
also suggests that our empirical strategy is able to uncover (at least some) general equilibrium
e⁄ects; skill upgrading of hospitals is likely to be a response to the ESR-level increase in the
demand for hospital services.
Third, we ￿nd no evidence that rising income is associated with an increase in hospital
utilization (as measured by either admissions or patient days) or in hospital capacity (as
26As detailed in the notes to Table 4, we adjust both the dependent variable and income for hospital-utilization
weighted population (HUWP) to account for population migration in response to our instrument. The exceptions
are in columns 4 and in columns 8-11 in which income is still adjusted for (i.e., divided by) HUWP, so that
we are measuring the increase in income per adjusted population, but the dependent variable is not adjusted
for HUWP. In column 4 the dependent variable is a ratio (of skilled nurses to total nurses) which would not
increase mechanically with population; in columns 8-11, the dependent variables (number of hospitals, number
of technologies, or indicator for speci￿c technologies) are count variables or indicators, which would not be
expected to scale linearly with population in the same way as, e.g., spending or admissions are likely to. For
these reasons, we do not adjust these dependent variables for population. As discussed above, not adjusting for
migration could be interpreted as providing upper bound estimates of responsiveness to income.
27We only have information on RN and LPN employment for the following years: 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976,
1978, 1980-2005. Our baseline elasticity estimate for hospital expenditures declines to 0.449 (s.e. 0.181) when
the odd years in the 1970s are excluded.
16measured by beds). These results are shown in columns 5 through 7.28 The remaining columns
of Table 4 document the impact of rising income on hospital entry and technology adoption;
we defer a discussion of these results until Section 4.29
4 The Role of Income in Rising Health Share of GDP
We now present the implications of our estimates for the role of rising income in explaining the
rising health share in the United States. The bulk of the section is then devoted to a discussion
of several potential concerns and caveats with this out-of-sample extrapolation exercise.
4.1 Income and the Rising Health Share of GDP
Let us focus on the results from our baseline speci￿cation (Table 3, column 3), which are
roughly in the middle of the range of elasticities we report in various alternative speci￿cations
below.
The point estimate of an elasticity of 0.72 implies that the approximate doubling of real
per capita GDP between 1960 and 2005 (from $19,212 to $41,874 in $2005) should have caused
a decline in the health share of GDP from 5 percent to about 4 percent. The upper end of the
95 percent con￿dence interval from our baseline estimate is an income elasticity of 1.13. This
allows us to reject a role of rising income in increasing the health share of GDP by more than
0.5 percentage points between 1960 and 2005, i.e., it does not explain more than 5 percent of
the overall increase in health share over this time period.
We can also interpret our estimates in terms of their implications for rising income in
explaining rising health expenditures (rather than the rising health share of GDP). The point
estimate suggests that rising real per capita income may be able to explain about 15 percent of
the rise in real per capita health expenditures, while the upper end of the 95 percent con￿dence
28The point estimates are uniformly negative and in the case of admissions and patient days, they are sta-
tistically signi￿cant. We caution against putting too much weight on the suggestive evidence of a decline in
utilization, since the statistical signi￿cance of these estimates is not as robust across alternative speci￿cations
as that of the other results reported in Table 4. Nonetheless, we ￿nd a decline in hospital utilization associated
with the increase in incomes to be plausible, since rising income may improve health.
29We also explored the relationship between our income variation and public funding of health care, using
data from the Regional Economic Information System; these data are available at the ESR level annually for
our entire study period. Public spending on health care appears to fall as income rises, with Medicaid spending
falling substantially more than Medicare spending. Since the income of either Medicare or Medicaid bene￿ciaries
should not be a⁄ected much by our instrument (the former are predominantly retirees with a pre-determined
income stream and the latter are, by de￿nition, constrained to be very low income), these results likely re￿ ect a
potential crowding out of scarce hospital resources from those whose incomes have risen and perhaps also policy
responses of state governments to changing incomes. The decline in Medicaid spending may further re￿ ect
reductions in eligibility for Medicaid resulting from the increase in employment. These results are available
upon request.
17interval allows us to reject a role for rising real per capita income in explaining more than one
quarter of the rise in real per capita health spending.30
Therefore, our results suggest that while rising income may be an important component
of growing health expenditures, it is unlikely to have contributed much to the increase in the
share of GDP spent on health care in the United States. We next turn to several potential
concerns with this extrapolation exercise.
4.2 National and Global General Equilibrium E⁄ects
A thorough empirical examination of the role that rising income plays in the growth of the
health care sector requires incorporating any general equilibrium e⁄ects of income on health
care spending. While our empirical strategy is designed to capture (and indeed - as evidence
by the skill upgrading results in Table 4 - appears to capture) general equilibrium e⁄ects that
occur at the level of the local economy, it does not incorporate any general equilibrium e⁄ects
at the national or global level.31
Two such general equilibrium e⁄ects that could potentially increase the income elasticity
of health expenditures above what we have estimated are induced innovation e⁄ects (which
could occur at the national or global level) and national political economy responses to rising
income. We discuss each in turn.
Endogenous technology responses While our estimates incorporate the impact of income
on technology adoption and entry of new hospitals at the ESR level, they may understate the
e⁄ects of rising incomes if these induced the development of major new global technologies,
which then led to a sizable expansion in health expenditures. This concern is particularly
important since technological change in health care is commonly believed to be one of the key
drivers of rising health care expenditures (e.g., Newhouse, 1992, Fuchs, 1996, Congressional
Budget O¢ ce, 2008).
In this subsection, we argue that an induced technology response to rising income is unlikely
to have contributed to a sizable increase in health care spending. Our argument has two
parts. First, if present and economically signi￿cant, an induced innovation response to rising
income should also manifest itself at the ESR level in the form of entry of new hospitals
(which presumably embody new technologies) and/or adoption of new technologies at existing
hospitals. In particular, even though innovations take place at the national or global level,
30On the basis of the existing correlation studies (described in the Introduction), past studies that have
attempted to decompose the causes of the rise in health spending have concluded that the rise in income may
account for anywhere from 5 percent (Cutler, 1995) to a quarter (Newhouse, 1992) of the spending growth.
31Indeed, we ￿nd it di¢ cult to imagine a convincing empirical straetgy that could capture national and global
general equilibirum e⁄ects of rising income.
18the same mechanism leading to induced innovations at the national or global level should also
lead to faster adoption of these technologies in areas with greater increases in demand (e.g.,
Acemoglu, 2002, 2007). Second, existing theory suggests that induced innovations should
be directed to sectors that are otherwise expanding rapidly (see in particular Appendix A
below), while our estimates suggest that, all else equal, health expenditures increase less than
proportionately with income.
Turning to the ￿rst component of the argument, we ￿nd no evidence that rising income
is associated with an increase in hospital entry or technology adoption. These results are
summarized in columns 8 through 11 of Table 4. Column 8 of this table shows a negative and
statistically insigni￿cant impact of income on the number of hospitals (so that the number of
hospitals appears to have grown relatively more in areas experiencing slower income growth).
The rest of Table 4 turns to technology adoption. The AHA data contain binary indicators
for whether the hospital has various ￿facilities￿ , such as a blood bank, open heart surgery
facilities, CT scanner, occupational therapy services, dental services, and genetic counseling
services. These data have been previously used to study technology adoption decisions in
hospitals, and in particular hospital responsiveness to economic incentives including the insur-
ance regime and relative factor prices (see, e.g., Cutler and Sheiner, 1998, Baker and Phibbs,
2002, Finkelstein, 2007, Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008). Since they contain only indicator
variables for the presence of various facilities, we cannot investigate the potential upgrading of
existing technology or the intensity of technology use, but we can study the impact of changes
in income on the total number of facilities, proxying for technology adoption decisions on the
extensive margin.
During the time period we study, the AHA collects information on the presence of 172
di⁄erent ￿facilities￿ . These are listed, together with their sample means (the fraction of ESRs
each technology is in) and the years in which they are available in Appendix Table A2. On
average, a given facility is reported in the data for 7 out of the possible 21 years; only nine of
the technologies are in the data for all years. Moreover, as is readily apparent from Appendix
Table A2, the list encompasses a range of very di⁄erent types of facilities. Given these two
features of the data, we pursue two complementary approaches to analyzing the relationship
between income and technology adoption with the AHA data (see Acemoglu and Finkelstein,
2008 for a similar strategy).
Our ￿rst approach to investigating the impact of income on technology adoption, which
is shown in column 9, treats all facilities equally and measures technology as the log of the
number of distinct technologies in a given ESR in a given year. The year ￿xed e⁄ects in our IV
estimate of equation (4) adjust for the fact that the set of technologies reported in each year
19di⁄ers. The results show no substantively or statistically signi￿cant evidence of an increase in
the number of distinct technologies in the area in response to the increase in income. In fact,
the point estimate on income is negative and statistically insigni￿cant. It is also substantively
small, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in area income is associated with a statistically
insigni￿cant decrease in the number of technologies in the area of 1.3 percent.32
A drawback of this approach is that it treats all technologies as perfect substitutes. As
an alternative, we estimated hazard models of the time to adoption for speci￿c technologies
that are in the data for at least 15 years of our 21 year sample period. As in Acemoglu and
Finkelstein (2008), we limit our analysis to technologies that were identi￿ed as ￿high tech￿by
previous researchers (Cutler and Sheiner, 1998, Baker, 2001, and Baker and Phibbs, 2002).
Unfortunately, there are only two technologies that meet these criteria in our sample: open
heart surgery and diagnostic radioisotope facility. Both have been found in other work to be
responsive to economic incentives (Finkelstein, 2007, Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008). Both
of these technologies were di⁄using over our sample period, though open heart surgery started
from a lower prevalence and di⁄used more rapidly.33 To investigate the impact of ESR income
on local technology adoption decisions, we estimate semi-parametric Cox hazard models for
these two technologies as functions of income. In particular, the conditional probability that
ESR j adopts the technology in question at time t (meaning that at least one hospital in
the ESR adopts the technology conditional on there being no hospital in the area that had
previously adopted this technology) is modeled as
￿jt = ￿0t exp(￿ log ~ yjt + XT
j ￿); (7)
where ￿0t is a fully ￿ exible, non-parametric baseline hazard, ~ yjt is our baseline measure of
(HUWP-adjusted) income, and Xj is a vector of (time-invariant) covariates. Since we have
at most a single transition (adoption) for each ESR, we cannot include ESR ￿xed e⁄ects in
the hazard model. Instead, we include time-invariant ESR characteristics in the vector Xj,
in particular, region ￿xed e⁄ects for the three census regions within the South, total hospital
expenditures in 1970, and total hospital beds in 1970. The fully ￿ exible baseline hazard in the
Cox model is speci￿ed with respect to calendar time and thus controls for time e⁄ects. As in our
baseline speci￿cation, income is an endogenous right-hand side variable, which we instrument
32To provide some context for comparison, using the same technology measure (but at the hospital level rather
than at the ESR level) Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) show that, in its ￿rst three years, the introduction of
Medicare PPS was associated with, on average, the adoption of one new technology at the hospital level (about
a 4 percent increase in the average number of distinct technologies that the hospital has).
33Open heart surgery is in our data for all 21 years (1970-1990) and diagnostic radioisotope therapy for 19
years (1972-1990). Only 43 percent of ESRs had open heart surgery technology in 1970, whereas about three
quarters of ESRs did so by 1990. About three quarters of ESRs had diagnostic radioisotope faciltiies in 1972
and 92 percent had it by 1990.
20with logpt￿1￿Ij. We implement our instrumental variables estimator using a control function
approach (Newey, Powell, and Vella, 1999). Speci￿cally, we include the residual (^ ujt) from
the ￿rst stage regression in equation (5) as an additional covariate in equation (7). We report
bootstrapped standard errors and p-values for this two-step estimator. The results reported in
columns 10 and 11 in Table 4 show no evidence of a signi￿cant increase in technology adoption
associated with an increase in income. The point estimates suggest a negative relationship
between log income and adoption of open-heart surgery, and a positive relationship between
log income and adoption of the diagnostic radioisotope facility. However, both estimates are
imprecise and not statistically di⁄erent from zero.34
Next, turning to the theoretical argument, Appendix A outlines a simple model of induced
innovations and demonstrates that development of new technologies will tend to be directed
toward sectors that are expanding more rapidly. The implications of this theory are consistent
with existing empirical evidence, which indicate that medical innovation responds to expected
market size (e.g., Acemoglu and Linn, 2004, Finkelstein, 2004). In the present context, these
theoretical expectations imply that innovations induced by the secular rise in incomes should
not be favoring the health care sector. In particular, our point estimates suggest that, ignoring
induced technology e⁄ects, health care expenditures increase less than proportionately with
aggregate income. Thus, as incomes rise, the market size for health care technologies will
increase less than the market size for a range of other technologies. As a consequence, the
induced technology channel suggests that there should not be disproportionate technological
advances in the health care sector in response to the secular increase in incomes. As the
model in Appendix A highlights, the main exception to this conclusion is that even a less than
proportionate increase in the size of the market for health care technologies might jump-start
medical technological advances if technological change in the health care sector was unpro￿table
prior to income reaching a certain minimum threshold. This exception seems implausible (at
least to us) given that advances in medical technologies have been ongoing for more than a
century and plausibly at roughly a constant rate (as mortality has been declining at a roughly
constant rate over this same period (Cutler and Meara, 2003)).35
Limited income-induced technology e⁄ects for the health care sector are also consistent
34By contrast, Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) ￿nd statistically signi￿cant increases in the adoption of both
of these technologies in response to a change in Medicare￿ s hospital reimbursement policy for labor inputs. This
suggests that the adoption of these technologies is generally responsive to economic incentives.
35Of course, the speci￿c nature of medical technological progress has varied over time. For example, improve-
ments in sanitation and other public health measures were a primary factor in mortality declines early in the
20th century, while penicillin and other antibiotics were a key factor mid-century, and medical interventions
that reduce cardiovascular disease mortality were critical in the latter part of the century (Cutler and Meara,
2003).
21with the results reported in Table 4, which show no signi￿cant e⁄ects on hospital entry or
technology adoption driven by ESR-level income changes. The lack of a response in hospital
entry and technology adoption bolsters the argument that, because the relative market size
for the health care sector does not increase disproportionately following an increase in income,
the induced technology e⁄ects should also be limited.
Overall, while we cannot conclusively rule out major national or global induced technology
responses to the secular increase in income in the United States, which could in turn have
further e⁄ects on health expenditures, our empirical evidence and theoretical expectations
suggest that these e⁄ects should be relatively small and thus should not change our basic
conclusion that rising incomes are unlikely to be the major factor in the run-up in the share
of GDP spent on health care.
Political economy e⁄ects of rising incomes Although our empirical strategy would not
capture any e⁄ect of income on health care expenditures that operate via a national political
economy response to rising income, our state-level results incorporate potential responses at the
state and sub-state levels. The similarity between the estimate of the income elasticity at the
state level (see Table 3 column 6) and our baseline estimate at the ESR level (Table 3 column 3)
suggests that these state-level policy responses do not signi￿cantly increase the responsiveness
of health care expenditures to income, although there may be substantial sub-state level policy
responses captured by both our ESR- and state-level estimates.36
While our empirical strategy does not incorporate national political economy e⁄ects re-
sulting from rising incomes, health policy in the United States is highly decentralized, with
much of the public involvement occurring at the state (or lower) level of government. There-
fore our empirical strategy likely captures much of the potential political economy responses.
This holds for both public provision and public ￿nancing of health care, both of which are
potentially a⁄ected by changes in income.
In terms of public provision of health care, about one third of hospitals in the United States
(accounting for about one third of hospital expenditures) are publicly owned. About 85 percent
of these hospitals (constituting about three-quarters of public hospital expenditures) are non-
federal (i.e., state-, county-, or city-owned). Thus most of any e⁄ect that income changes have
on public support for hospital ￿nancing would be incorporated into our state-level analysis.
In terms of public ￿nancing of health care, by far the two largest sources are Medicare and
36This observation also underscores that, as already emphasized in the Introduction, the empirical relationship
between income and health spending in the United States in the latter half of the 20th century, which we are
exploring, may re￿ ect a variety of institutional factors beyond the willingness of households to spend more on
health care as their incomes grow.
22Medicaid, which have similar levels of spending (CMS, 2006). Medicaid is jointly ￿nanced by
the federal and state governments but the states are given considerable autonomy in the design
of program eligibility and bene￿t requirements (Gruber, 2003). Political economy e⁄ects of
changing income on Medicaid design are likely to be captured by our estimates using state-level
variation.
Medicare, in contrast, is a fully federal program, so that any political economy e⁄ects of
income on Medicare design would not be captured by our estimates. This is a potentially
important channel through which rising income may a⁄ect health spending, and not one that
we can directly estimate. Nevertheless, it is reassuring in this regard that Medicare spending
per bene￿ciary over our time period has not risen faster than overall health spending per
capita.37 If the national political economy response of Medicare policy were an important part
of the mechanism through which the secular increase in income contributes to the growth of
health share of GDP, Medicare spending per bene￿ciary should have been rising much faster
than overall health spending per capita over the past several decades. The fact that it has
not suggests that any potential political economy responses to rising incomes working through
Medicare does not introduce a serious downward bias in our estimate of the role of income
growth in the run-up of the health share of GDP.
4.3 Hospital Spending Versus Total Health Expenditure
An important limitation of our estimates is that the dependent variable measures hospital ex-
penditures rather than total health expenditures, which may have di⁄erent income elasticities.
Hospital expenditures are the single largest component of health care expenditures, accounting
for close to two-￿fths of the total. By contrast, spending on physicians accounts for about one
￿fth of total health expenditures, and spending on drugs accounts for about one-tenth; these
shares have been roughly constant since 1960 (CMS, 2006).
Our reading of the available evidence is that total health expenditures are unlikely to have
a signi￿cantly higher income elasticity than hospital spending. The ￿rst piece of suggestive
evidence comes from Figure 1, which shows that the hospital share of total health expenditures
has been roughly constant over the last half century. If income elasticities were higher for the
non-hospital components of health expenditures, and if the rise in income over this time period
were the major driver of the increase in health expenditures, we should see (all else equal) a
37We compared the growth in per capita health expenditures to the growth in per bene￿ciary Medicare
spending from 1975 to 2005. We started in 1975 to allow the Medicare program (which only began in 1965 and
expanded to cover SSDI recipients starting in 1973) to be fully phased in. Between 1975 and 2005 Medicare
spending per bene￿ciary grew at an average annualized rate of 7.86%, while health spending per capita grew
at 7.62%. Data on total and Medicare health expenditures and Medicare bene￿ciaries can be found at http:
//www.cms.hhs.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/ and http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareEnRpts/.
23decline in the share of hospital spending in overall health expenditure. The fact that Figure 1
shows no such decline supports our overall conclusion.
Our second piece of evidence comes from estimates of income elasticities of overall health
care expenditures and of the hospital- and non-hospital components thereof, based on several
complementary data sources. We use these data to investigate whether there is any evidence
that overall health expenditures are more responsive than hospital expenditures to changes in
income. To preview, although estimates from the other available data sources are often quite
imprecise (motivating our preference for the AHA data set), we do not ￿nd any evidence that
overall health expenditures are more income elastic than hospital expenditures.
We have state-level data on total health expenditures and its components from the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for 1972, 1976-1978 and 1980-1990 (instead of our
baseline sample 1970-1990). The HCFA estimates are based on a combination of administrative
and survey data. An important problem with these data is that each component is interpolated
whenever data are missing between years (Levit, 1982, 1985). Such interpolation may bias the
estimated coe¢ cients, so the results from this data set have to be interpreted with caution.
Table 5 presents estimates from the HCFA data. Since we lose some variation by aggre-
gating from the ESR level to the state level, we report results both for our baseline sample of
the 16 the Southern states (Panel A) and for the entire United States (Panel B). Column 1
shows that our ￿rst stage is robust to state-level analysis for the subset of years for which we
have HCFA data. Columns 2 and 3 show our estimated income elasticity from the HCFA data
for total health expenditures and the hospital subcomponent, respectively. Both estimated
income elasticities are positive but quantitatively small and imprecise, and thus statistically
insigni￿cant. The income elasticity of hospital spending using the HCFA data is also noticeably
smaller than that estimated using the AHA data.38
However, most importantly for our purposes, the point estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Table
5 suggest similar income elasticities for hospital expenditures and total health expenditures.
Columns 4 through 9 present results for the other components of health expenditures, and
38The hospital expenditure data in the HCFA series are estimated using the AHA data for non-federal hos-
pitals, but use unpublished Federal agency data for federal hospital expenditures (Levit, 1982). There are also
several di⁄erences between how we use the AHA data and how they are used in creating the HCFA data. Most
importantly, the HCFA estimates interpolate missing data (Levit, 1982, 1985). Average state-year hospital
expenditures are similar in the two data sets ($2,641 million from the HCFA data compared to $2,333 million
for the same state-years in the AHA data). Log hospital expenditures are also highly correlated across the two
data sets at the state-year level (correlation = 0.98). However, conditional on state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, the
correlation in the residual log hospital expenditures is only 0.67. This presumably helps explain why the income
elasticity estimates di⁄er. Using our AHA hospital data at the state level for the full United States and limiting
the sample to the years for which the HCFA data are available (i.e., the analog of Table 5 column 3 panel B),
we estimate a statistically signi￿cant income elasticity of 0.509 (standard error = 0.225). This is statistically
indistinguishable from the HCFA estimate of 0.139 (standard error = 0.151).
24provide some intuition for why hospital and total health expenditure income elasticities may
be similar. The point estimates suggest that the income elasticities of spending on physician
services, on dental services, on drugs and other medical non-durables, and on vision products
are greater than the income elasticity of hospital spending, while nursing home care and other
health services have large negative income elasticities.39 Overall, the results in Table 5 are
generally imprecisely estimated, but the point estimates are uniformly consistent with similar
income elasticities for total health expenditures and for hospital expenditures.
Results from several other data sources are also consistent with this conclusion, though
again are similarly imprecise. We examined the income elasticity of state-level Health Services
Gross State Product (GSP) from 1970-1990. Health services GSP account for roughly 26%
of total health expenditures. Our estimates using health services GSP show no evidence of
a greater income elasticity than that for hospital spending; indeed the point estimates are
considerably smaller than our estimates for hospital expenditures, although they are quite
imprecise.40
We also examined the impact of area income on the income of di⁄erent groups of health care
providers (results available on request). If non-hospital components of health care expenditures￿
such as physician expenditures￿ are substantially more income elastic than hospital expendi-
tures, we would expect to ￿nd that the earnings of the non-hospital based health care providers
are also substantially more income elastic than hospital expenditures and than the earnings of
health care providers that contribute to hospital expenditures, such as nurses and health care
technicians. Using decadal Census data aggregated to the state level, we estimated the income
elasticity of the earnings of the following groups of health care providers: physicians, nurses,
health care technicians (including clinical laboratory technicians and therapy assistants), and
other health services workers (including health aids, nursing aids and attendants).41 Our IV
point estimates show no evidence that physician earnings are more responses to area income
than hospital expenditures or than the earnings of other health care providers. However, the
39The large negative income elasticity for nursing home care strikes us as intuitive. Wealthier individuals can
more easily pay for assistance at home to substitue for nursing home care (which Medicaid will cover) than can
poor individuals.
40The results for state-level Health Services GSP are shown in Table 7, column 6, Panel A and B). The rest
of that table is discussed in subsection 4.5 below. Comparable state-level estimates for hospital expenditures
are show in Table 6 Panel A, columns 1 and 3. The Gross State Product (State GDP) estimates are produced
annually by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The speci￿c industries within health services (SIC code 80) are
listed at http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics/NSIC8B.HTM#S80. The major source of state data for the health
services GSP estimates are sales and payrolls from the (quinquennial) census of service industries; intercensal
years are interpolated and extrapolated using wages and salaries reported annually to the BEA (see http:
//www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/gsp/GDPState.pdf).
41Our ￿rst stage is robust to aggregation to the state level and to decadal (vs annual) analysis; the IV estimate
of AHA hospital expenditures in this speci￿cation is generally similar in magnitude although somewhat less
precise than that in our baseline speci￿cation.
25estimates using the Census income data￿ particularly those for physician income￿ are notice-
ably less precise than those from comparable speci￿cations using the AHA data on hospital
expenditures, so that one should not place too much emphasis on these results.42
Overall, while there are important limitations to each data source, a number of comple-
mentary data sets with information on state-level health expenditures suggest that the income
elasticity of overall health expenditures is unlikely to be signi￿cantly higher than the income
elasticity of hospital spending. This is also consistent with the time-series evidence in Figure
1. We therefore conclude that our estimates of the income elasticity of hospital spending are
likely to be representative of the income elasticity of total health expenditures.
4.4 Labor Income Versus Total Income
Our baseline income measure captures only the e⁄ect of our instrument on labor income. If
capital income and labor income do not respond proportionately to our instrument, we may
be under-stating (or over-stating) the ￿rst-stage relationship, and consequently, over-stating
(or under-stating) the income elasticity in the second stage. Unfortunately, annual data on
labor and capital income do not exist for our time period at a level of disaggregation below
the state.
We therefore investigate how our estimates at the state level change when we use Gross
State Product (GSP) as our measure of income, rather than our baseline payroll measure; unlike
payroll, GSP includes both labor and capital income. Table 6 shows the results of this exercise.
Panel A shows the IV estimates, and Panel B shows the ￿rst-stage estimates. Columns 1 and 2
compare results at the state level when labor (payroll) income and GSP are used, respectively,
as our income measure. The ￿rst stage suggests that, in response to our instrument, non-labor
income appears to rise by the same proportion, or by slightly more, then our primary measure
of labor income (compare columns 1 and 2 of Panel B). If anything, therefore, the results
suggest that the estimates using labor income only may be slightly over-stating the income
elasticity of health expenditures (compare columns 1 and 2 of Panel A).
Since, as discussed, we lose variation by aggregating to the state level, we also report results
at the state level when we include the entire US in the sample rather than just the 16 states
in the South. Column 3 shows the results when we use labor income (from the CBP payroll
42We also examined the elasticity of various components of state-level health care utilization from the NHIS.
The NHIS data cover 1973-1990 (data before 1973 do not have state identi￿ers) and are not interpolated, which
is a clear advantage relative to the HCFA data. On the other hand, the NHIS only measures utilization on
the extensive margin. This implies that NHIS data will not be informative about increases in expenditure on
the intensive margin. As in the AHA data, we ￿nd no evidence in the NHIS of a positive income elasticity of
hospital utilization. We also ￿nd no evidence of a positive income elasticity of doctor visits (indeed, the point
estimates are negative, though not statistically signi￿cant). Results available on request.
26data) as our measure of income and column 4 shows the results when we use the GSP measure,
which incorporates capital income. Once again the results suggest that non-labor income may
rise slightly more than proportionately with labor income, so that our income elasticities in
our baseline estimates may be slightly overstated.43
4.5 Heterogeneity in Income Elasticities
Another potential concern with our conclusions concerning the role of rising incomes in ex-
plaining the rising health share of GDP is that our IV estimates are based on a speci￿c type of
income variation as well as a speci￿c area of the country and time period. If there is substantial
heterogeneity in the income elasticity of health expenditures across any of these dimensions,
out-of-sample extrapolations may be particularly unreliable. We therefore explored whether
there appears to be substantial heterogeneity in our estimated income elasticity. All in all, we
read the available evidence as suggesting that the quantitative estimates are reasonably similar
across di⁄erent sources of income variation, geographic samples, time periods, and time hori-
zons; we therefore do not see any reason to suspect that heterogeneous elasticities are likely to
lead to a serious underestimation of the e⁄ect of rising incomes on health care expenditures.
Source and extent of income variation At a general level, one might be concerned that
the source and range of the variation in income that we are exploiting may be insu¢ cient
to estimate (or detect) income elasticities signi￿cantly greater than one. To alleviate this
concern, we estimated similar IV regressions with spending on goods that can be classi￿ed as a
luxury on a priori grounds (e.g., recreation). Since we do not have data on spending on other
goods at the ESR level, we pursued this strategy at the state level using data on industry-
speci￿c Gross State Products (GSP) for other service industries. Speci￿cally, we used our
instrument at the state level to examine the income elasticity of four potential luxury goods:
￿amusement and recreation services,￿￿hotels and other lodging places,￿￿legal services￿and
￿other services,￿which includes (among other things) record production, actuarial consulting,
music publishing, and other consulting.44 We also estimated the income elasticity of ￿food and
kindred products,￿which we expect to be a necessity (health services GSP, which was already
discussed in subsection 4.3, is also included in this table).
The results are shown in Table 7 and suggest that our source of variation in income is
strong enough to uncover elasticities greater than one at the state level.45 Legal services and
43The results in column 3 also suggest that our estimates are not sensitive to using the entire United States.
In later robustness analysis we show this is true at the ESR level as well (see Table 9 below).
44A complete de￿nition of ￿other services￿can be found here: http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.
display?id=1014&tab=description.
45More information on each of these categories can be found here: http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/
27￿other services" both appear to be strong luxuries. Amusement services and hotels also show
an income elasticity of close to or above 1. By contrast, food stores appear to be a necessity,
with an income elasticity that is virtually the same as what we estimate for health services
(see column 6).
A more speci￿c concern is that, as discussed in Section 3.1, we cannot reject that our
income variation at the ESR level comes entirely from changes in employment at roughly
constant wages (see Table 2), while about half of income growth in the United States over
the last half century comes from increased wages per employed individual (US Census Bureau,
2008).46 This raises the potential concern that, if the elasticity of health spending with respect
to income is increasing in income, the elasticity of health care spending with respect to increases
in wages may be larger than the elasticity with respect to increases in employment.
Table 8 investigates whether there is any evidence of this type of convexity in Engel curves
for health expenditures. Column 1 reports results from the baseline IV speci￿cation, while
column 2 adds an interaction of the ESR￿ s (log) income with its (log) income in 1970. This
strategy allows the e⁄ect of changes in income to vary based on initial income levels and
provides a simple check against the possibility that the income elasticity of health expenditures
may vary systematically with the level of income of the area. We instrument for log income
and the interaction of log income with 1970 ESR log income with our standard instrument
(oil reserves times log oil prices) and the interaction of this instrument with 1970 ESR log
income. The results show no evidence that the Engel curve for health expenditures is convex;
if anything the point estimates suggest a (statistically insigni￿cant) concave Engel curve.
As another check on the potential convexity of the relationship between income and hospital
spending, we looked for nonlinearities in the reduced-form relationship. Column 3 reproduces
the baseline reduced-form results for comparison and column 4 reports the results of a modi￿ed
reduced-form speci￿cation, which also includes the square of the baseline instrument (i.e.,
(logpt￿1 ￿ Ij)
2 as well as logpt￿1 ￿Ij). The estimates in column 4 also show no evidence of a
convex relationship between income and health expenditures. The lack of any convexity in the
relationship between income and health spending further suggests that the income elasticity
of health expenditures is unlikely to be signi￿cantly greater at higher levels of income or for
larger income changes.
Finally, we note that because oil prices both rise and fall over our time period, our instru-
default.cfm?series=SIC. First-stage results for this same speci￿cation are shown in Table 6, Panel B, columns
1 and 3. Second stage results for this same speci￿cation using the AHA hospital expenditure data as the de-
pendent variable can be found in Table 6, Panel A, columns 1 and 3.
46At the state level we estimate that our instrument is associated with a statistically signi￿cant increase in
wages, although the increase in income is still predominantly due to an increase in employment (not shown).
28ment predicts both increases and decreases in income. From a purely estimation standpoint,
this is a strength of our instrument, since it makes it less likely that it simply captures di⁄er-
ential (monotonic) trends across di⁄erent areas of the country. Nevertheless, since much of the
motivation of our paper is related to the e⁄ects of rising incomes on health care expenditures,
we also investigated whether the e⁄ects of rises and declines in income are asymmetric. In par-
ticular, we re-estimated our baseline models allowing positive and negative changes (between
t and t ￿ 1) in income to have di⁄erent e⁄ects (and we instrumented these income variables
with our baseline instrument interacted with an indicator for whether oil prices rose between
dates t and t ￿ 1). We found no evidence of such asymmetric e⁄ects (results available upon
request).
Di⁄erent areas and time period Table 9 explores the sensitivity of our estimates to
de￿ning the sample based on di⁄erent geographic regions and di⁄erent time periods. Panel
A shows the IV estimates and Panel B shows the corresponding ￿rst-stage results. Column 1
reproduces our baseline estimates, which are for the 16 Southern states focusing on the time
period 1970-1990.
As discussed above, we chose to limit our baseline sample to the Southern United States
both because the oil reserves are concentrated in the South and because the ESRs in this region
are more comparable, thus less likely to experience di⁄erential trends in hospital spending
owing to other reasons. In column 2 we further limit the sample to the 7 Southern states that
have oil reserves in our data. The results are quite similar. In column 3 we go in the opposite
direction, and look at the entire United States. The results in this column show that expanding
the sample to the entire United States (not including Alaska and Virginia) results in a very
similar point estimate of the income elasticity (0.804 vs. 0.723 in the baseline), though the
estimate is less precise (standard error = 0.631 compared to 0.214 in the baseline).47
We also explored whether within the South our estimates were sensitive to excluding a par-
ticular state. Appendix Table A3 shows the results from estimating our baseline speci￿cation
(from column 1) dropping each one of the 16 states at a time. The results indicate that the
estimates are generally quite robust both in terms of magnitude and statistical signi￿cance to
the omission of a single state. The exception occurs when we exclude Texas. In this case, the
point estimate falls by about 40 percent; combined with the increase in standard error, this
makes the estimate of the income elasticity of hospital expenditure no longer signi￿cant at the
5% level. This is not surprising since much of the variation in oil intensity in our sample is
47We do not include Alaska because of the Alaska Permanent Fund (established in 1976), as well as the
di¢ culty in forming consistent data by ESR between 1970 and 1990. We do not include Virginia because of
the di¢ culty in forming consistent data by ESR between 1970 and 1990.
29within Texas (see Figure 3).
Our baseline time period is for 1970-1990 and covers the original oil boom and bust. In
column 4 of Table 9, we return to our baseline Southern states sample, but now expand the
time period 1970-2005 (thus including all available years with data). Figure 2 shows that oil
prices experienced a second boom starting in 1999. Nevertheless, we lose the ￿rst stage when
we include the post 1990 years (and therefore do not report the corresponding IV estimate).
This weaker ￿rst-stage relationship appears to re￿ ect the inadequacy of imposing constant
ESR ￿xed e⁄ects over a 36 year period. Indeed, when this assumption is relaxed by including
state-speci￿c time trends, the estimates again become statistically signi￿cant. This is shown
in column 5, which shows a ￿rst-stage relationship and an IV estimate of similar magnitude
to the baseline.
Short-run versus long-run income elasticities We estimate the short-run response of
health expenditures to income, which may be di⁄erent from their long-run response. For
example, increased demand may result in the short run in higher prices, with the response of
quantities emerging with a delay as capacity expands. However, there are no strong theoretical
reasons to expect the long-run income elasticity to be greater than the short-run elasticity.
For example, if health care demand is inelastic (with price elasticity less than one, which is
plausible, for example, because of insurance), as capacity expands in the long run in the face of
rising incomes, overall health expenditures will increase less than in the short run. In addition,
if long-run increases in income also improve overall health, the long-run increase in health
expenditures may again be less than in the short run. Nevertheless, even though there are no
a priori reasons to expect long-run e⁄ects to be greater than short-run e⁄ects, it is important
to understand whether our empirical strategy is estimating the former or the latter.
To investigate this issue, we re-estimated our regressions using decadal observations, thus
removing the source of variation due to short-run changes in our instrument. Table 10 compares
our baseline results￿ which use annual observations from 1970-1990 in columns 1 through 3￿
with the estimates using only decadal observations (1970, 1980, 1990) in columns 4 through 6.
With only the decadal observations, the ￿rst stage is only slightly weaker (compare columns 4
and 1). The IV elasticity estimate from the decadal estimate is similar to the baseline annual
estimate (0.794 compared to 0.723) and still statistically signi￿cant. These results therefore
suggest that the long-run income elasticity is similar to the short-run elasticity.
This conclusion also receives support from the lack of capacity responses. If long-run e⁄ects
were signi￿cantly larger than short-run e⁄ects, we would expect to see hospitals expanding
capacity (either simultaneously with the increase in health expenditures or gradually as they
30reach their capacity constraints). However, Table 4 showed no evidence of an increase in
hospital capacity or utilization (in particular, there was no increase in admissions, patient
days, hospital beds, and hospital entry in response to the rise in local income).
A related issue is that there might be heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics of hos-
pital spending in response to increases in income. For example, suppose that some of the
ESRs respond immediately to increases in income, while other ESRs take one or two years to
respond. In this case, results using the annual panel and assuming immediate and complete
adjustment would underestimate the true long-run income elasticity. We show in Appendix B
that speci￿cations using 3-year averages typically perform better when there are heterogeneous
adjustment dynamics by ESR. Thus in column 7 we report results based on 3-year averages.
The estimated elasticity increases slightly (from 0.723 to 0.826).
5 Robustness
In this section, we provide several robustness checks of our baseline estimates, particularly
focusing on whether our causal estimates of the e⁄ect of income on health care expenditures
might be spurious and whether they may be underestimating the income elasticity of health
care expenditures.
5.1 Exclusion Restriction
The exclusion restriction of our IV strategy is that absent oil price changes, ESRs with dif-
ferent levels of oil reserves would have experienced the same proportional changes in hospital
expenditures. In Table 11 we explore a variety of alternative speci￿cations designed to inves-
tigate the validity of this identifying assumption. As usual, Panel A shows the IV estimates,
while Panel B shows the corresponding ￿rst-stage results. Column 1 replicates our baseline
estimates.
Column 2 shows the results of a natural falsi￿cation test: we repeat the baseline analysis
of equation (5) (corresponding to column 1), but also include a 5-year lead of the instrument,
that is, logpt+5 ￿ Ij (where Ij again denotes oil reserves in ESR j). To the extent that our
instrument captures the impact of rising oil prices on the area￿ s income rather than di⁄erential
trends across areas with di⁄erent levels of oil reserves, future oil prices should not predict
current income changes. Column 2 in Panel B shows that the ￿rst-stage relationship is robust
to including the lead of the instrument. The coe¢ cient on the lead of the instrument is positive
and large (about 60 percent of that on the instrument), though statistically insigni￿cant. The
magnitude of this coe¢ cient raises some concerns about potential serial correlation. We explore
31issues of serial correlation in greater detail in the subsection 5.3. To preview, even if there is
serial correlation in the ￿rst stage, this does not necessarily create a bias in the IV estimates. In
addition, our robustness checks in the next subsection show that the statistical and quantitative
properties of our estimates are reasonably robust in alternative speci￿cations that explicitly
recognize the possibility of serial correlation.
The results from the IV estimates that include the ￿ve-year lead of the instrument (both in
the ￿rst and second stages) are shown in Panel A column 2. The estimate of income elasticity in
this speci￿cation remains statistically signi￿cant and increases somewhat in magnitude relative
to the baseline in column 1. The negative (and statistically insigni￿cant) coe¢ cient on the
￿ve-year lead of the instrument indicates that our IV estimates are unlikely to be capturing
pre-existing trends.
Column 3 shows the results from an alternative check on our identi￿cation strategy, in
which we additionally control for interactions between oil prices (logpt￿1) and ￿xed ESR
characteristics. In particular, we control for separate interactions between log oil prices in year
t-1 and each of log hospital expenditures in 1969, log hospital beds in 1969, log population in
1970, log area income in 1970 and log area employment in 1970. This ￿horse race￿between
our instrument and other interactions of oil prices and baseline area characteristics is useful
for two complementary reasons. First, it provides additional evidence that it is the interaction
between oil price shocks and availability of oil reserves leading to the source of income variation
that we are exploiting. Second, it indirectly controls for di⁄erential pre-existing trends in
health expenditures (and income) across ESRs, which are the main threat to our identi￿cation
strategy. Consistent with the limited di⁄erences in various ESR characteristics shown in Table
1b, the results of this horse race show that both our ￿rst-stage and second-stage estimates are
robust in magnitude and precision to the (simultaneous) inclusion of all of these interaction
terms. Very similar estimates are obtained when we include each interaction term one by one
(not shown).
Column 4 shows the results of adding region-speci￿c linear trends for the three Census
regions within the South. Column 5 shows the results of adding state-speci￿c linear trends.
These two speci￿cations allow di⁄erent regions (respectively, di⁄erent states) within the South
to be on di⁄erent linear time trends. The ￿rst stage is reasonably robust. The IV estimates
decline considerably in magnitude, and in the case of state speci￿c linear trends, they are
no longer statistically signi￿cant. Although this last result raises some concerns about the
magnitude and precision of our estimates of the income elasticity, if anything, it suggests that
our baseline model which does not control for state-speci￿c trends might lead to over-estimates
(rather than under-estimates) of this elasticity.
32Finally, as another natural and important falsi￿cation exercise, we checked the implications
of estimating our models on health expenditures data from 1955 through 1969 while assuming
that the oil price changes took place 15-years prior (more precisely, the year 1955 is assigned
the oil price for 1970, the year 1956 is assigned to the oil price in 1971, and so on through the
year 1969 which is assigned to the oil price of 1984).48 The period before 1970 shows virtually
constant oil prices before 1970 (see Figure 2). Therefore, if our identifying assumption is valid,
we should not see any di⁄erential changes in health expenditures across areas with di⁄erent
oil reserves prior to 1970, and in particular, we should not see more rapid increases in health
expenditures in areas with greater oil reserves. Column 6 shows the ￿rst-stage and reduced-
form results for our baseline speci￿cation if we limit it to the 1970 to 1984 period. The
￿rst-stage remains as does the reduced form, though the implied IV estimate is about one half
the size of our baseline estimate (which uses the entire 1970-1990 period). Column 7 shows the
result for the falsi￿cation exercise. Reassuringly, this falsi￿cation exercise shows no evidence
of a signi￿cant reduced-form relationship between our instruments and health expenditures;
the point estimate is negative (opposite sign from the "actual" estimate in column 6) and not
statistically signi￿cant. This ￿nding supports the validity of the identifying assumption that,
absent changes in oil prices, areas of the South with di⁄erent levels of oil intensity would have
experienced similar trends in their hospital expenditures.
Overall, we read the results in Table 11 as broadly supportive of our identifying assumption.
5.2 Alternative Speci￿cations of the Instrument
We also explored the robustness of our results to alternative speci￿cations of the instrument.
Table 12 shows the results. Panel A again shows the IV estimates and Panel B shows the
corresponding ￿rst-stage estimates. Column 1 replicates our baseline ￿rst-stage speci￿cation,
in which the instrument is the interaction of the total oil reserves and the log of the (lagged) oil
price, i.e., logpt￿1 ￿Ij, with again Ij measured as oil reserves. The remainder of the columns
show results for alternative (plausible) speci￿cations of the instrument; they tend to produce
smaller income elasticities than our baseline speci￿cation.
Columns 2 and 3 report results using di⁄erent functional forms for oil prices. Column 2
reports results in which the instrument is constructed as the interaction between the level of
(lagged) oil prices and oil reserves (i.e., pt￿1 ￿ Ij instead of logpt￿1 ￿ Ij as in our baseline
48The AHA data do not contain information on hospital expenditures prior to 1955, which is why we could
not extend this analysis even further back in time. We report only reduced-form results for this falsi￿cation
exercise because we do not have income data for the entire period from 1955 to 1969. Our primary source of
income data, CBP, extends back annually to 1964 and is available irregularly dating back to 1946. However,
before 1970 only ￿rst quarter payroll and employment data are available from CBP.
33speci￿cation). Column 3 reports results when we use the log oil price at time t rather than its
one year lag (i.e., logpt ￿ Ij instead of logpt￿1 ￿ Ij). With both alternative functional forms
for oil prices we continue to estimate strong ￿rst stages and statistically signi￿cant income
elasticities in the second stage that are similar to, though slightly smaller than, our baseline
estimate (the income elasticity estimates are 0.49 and 0.64 in columns 2 and 3 respectively,
compared to 0.72 in our baseline).
Columns 4 through 6 report results using di⁄erent ways of measuring the oil intensity of
the area. Recall that in our baseline speci￿cation we proxied oil intensity of area j by its total
(cumulative) oil reserves. Figure 3b shows that the oil reserve distribution is highly skewed and
one may be concerned that using the level of oil reserves might give disproportionate weight
to the ESRs with the highest oil reserves. Moreover, the e⁄ect of oil reserves on the demand
for labor, and thus on income, may be nonlinear, with large and very large oil reserves leading
to similar e⁄ects on income when oil prices rise. Motivated by these considerations, in column
4 we report results with an alternative measure of Ij, where oil reserves are censored at the
95th percentile of oil reserve distribution (the instrument is then constructed by interacting
this measure with logpt￿1). The results are very similar to the baseline. We continue to
estimate a strong ￿rst stage, and a statistically signi￿cant income elasticity; the estimated
income elasticity of 0.632 (standard error = 0.205) is only slightly smaller than the baseline
estimate. We also obtain similar estimates if instead we censor oil reserves at the 90th or the
99th percentiles (not shown).
As another check on possible nonlinearities, column 5 measures oil intensity by an indicator
variable for whether there are any large oil wells in the ESR (i.e., the instrument is now
1(Ij > 0)). The ￿rst stage is now slightly weaker (F-statistic of about 8), and the estimated
income elasticity rises to 1:10 (standard error = 0:67), but is no longer statistically signi￿cantly
at the 5 percent level.
Finally, in column 6 we measure oil intensity as the (de-meaned) mining share of employ-
ment in the ESR in 1970, interacted with an indicator variable for whether there are any large
oil wells in the ESR.49 Our ￿rst stage is now marginally stronger than in the preceding speci￿-
cation (F-statistic of about 11), and we estimate a statistically insigni￿cant income elasticity
of 0.860 (standard error = 0.870).
49We include the indicator variable for whether there are any large oil wells because mining employment is
de￿ned in the data to include all workers in oil mining, natural gas and coal mining. The indicator for oil wells
is included to separate out high mining share non-oil areas (such as coal mining areas of West Virginia).
345.3 Serial Correlation and Standard Errors
In our baseline model we cluster our standard errors at the state level; the standard errors are
therefore computed from a variance-covariance matrix that allows both for arbitrary correlation
in residuals across ESRs within a state and for serial correlation at the state or ESR level.
However, because we only have 16 states in our baseline (South only) sample, these standard
errors may be downward biased due to the relatively small number of clusters (Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller, 2008). As a simple robustness check, we computed the standard errors
allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at the ESR level (rather than the state
level). A possible disadvantage of these standard errors is that they do not allow for correlation
across ESRs within the same state, which may be important in practice.50 Clustering at the
ESR level increases the standard errors substantially, so that the ￿rst-stage F-statistic is now
5.50 (instead of 16.58 with clustering at the state level). The standard errors for the second
stage are also larger, but our IV estimate is still statistically signi￿cant at the 6 percent level
(results available upon request).
Another strategy to correct for potential biases in the standard errors resulting from the
small number of clusters at the state level is the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).51 We performed wild bootstraps resampling states with
replacement. In this case, we ￿nd reassuringly similar (indeed somewhat smaller) p-values to
our baseline speci￿cation with state-level clustering.52 In particular, using wild bootstraps we
￿nd that both the ￿rst stage and the second stage estimates are statistically signi￿cant at the
less than 1 percent level (results available upon request).
An alternative strategy to address concerns about potential serial correlation is to directly
model the dynamics of the error term in our structural equation (4) and then estimate this
extended model using instrumental-variables Generalized Least Squares (IV-GLS). In all of our
IV-GLS speci￿cations we allow for heteroscedasticity in the second-stage error term; we also
experiment with various assumptions regarding the nature of any autocorrelation. The details
of the implementation of IV-GLS and the procedure for the computation of the standard errors
are discussed in Appendix B. Table 13 reports the results. Column 1 shows estimates from
our baseline speci￿cation, but using a subsample of our original data; we limit the sample
to the 96 (out of 99) ESRs that have data in the full 21 years from 1970 to 1990. Column
50For example, a boom in an oil-rich ESR may attract in-migration from other ESRs within the same state,
reducing total payroll income in these ESRs and also potentially a⁄ecting health care expenditures through this
and other channels. The result would be a negative correlation in ESR-level residuals within a state.
51We thank Doug Miller for suggestions and for providing us with a sample code.
52In their Monte Carlo study, Cameron et al ￿nd it is important to calculate p-values based on t-statistics
rather than parameter estimates. We also computed p-values using parameter estimates, and found these to
be even lower (thus leading to more precise results) than the results reported here based on t-statistics.
351 veri￿es that this has no notable e⁄ect on our baseline results. Column 2 reports IV-GLS
results assuming a common AR(1) autocorrelation coe¢ cient across all ESRs. Column 3
reports results assuming an AR(2) speci￿cation of the residuals with common autocorrelation
coe¢ cients. In both speci￿cations the point estimate rises relative to the baseline, but is also
considerably less precise. Columns 4 and 5 report results assuming state-speci￿c AR(1) and
AR(2) errors respectively. Here the point estimates are very similar to the baseline speci￿cation
both in magnitude and in precision. Overall we interpret these results as supportive of the
robustness of the baseline speci￿cation.
As a ￿nal strategy to control for serial correlation, columns 6 and 7 include a lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side. In column 6, this model is estimated with ordinary
least squares and leads to a long-run elasticity of 0.859 (standard error = 0.213), which is
slightly higher than our baseline estimate. However, the least squares estimator in column 6 is
inconsistent because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.
Column 7 estimates the same model using the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator.
This GMM procedure estimates the same model in ￿rst di⁄erences using further lags of the
dependent variable as instruments. This leads to a considerably smaller long-run elasticity (=
0.142, standard error = 0.080) than in our baseline. Such smaller long-run elasticities make it
even less likely that rising incomes over the past half a century could be the primary driver of
the increase in the health share of GDP in the United States.53
6 Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of the secular rise in incomes in the dramatic run-up in the
health share of GDP in the United States, which increased from 5 percent of GDP in 1960 to 16
percent in 2005. A common conjecture is that rising incomes have played a primary role in the
increase in the health share of GDP. A ￿nding of a primary role for rising incomes would have
important implications for forecasting the future growth of the health share of GDP. It would
also provide crucial input into an investigation of the potential optimality (or sub-optimality)
of rising health share of GDP. Yet, surprisingly, little is known about the empirical impact of
rising aggregate incomes on health spending.
We attempted to estimate the causal e⁄ect of aggregate income on aggregate health expen-
ditures by instrumenting for local area income with time-series variation in global oil prices
53If we estimate our baseline model in ￿rst di⁄erences (and thus without further lagged dependent variables
on the right-hand side), the results are similar to those reported in column 7 from the GMM procedure. In
particular, the point estimate is 0.078 (standard error = 0.106). As we discuss in Appendix B, heterogeneous
adjustment dynamics can introduce signi￿cant downward bias in ￿rst-di⁄erence estimates, and we thus put less
weight on this estimate.
36interacted with cross-sectional variation in the oil reserves in di⁄erent areas of the Southern
United States. This strategy is attractive not only because it isolates a potentially-exogenous
source of variation in incomes but also because it incorporates local general equilibrium ef-
fects, as we estimate the response of health expenditures in the area to an aggregate change in
incomes. Across a wide range of speci￿cations, we estimate a positive and statistically signi￿-
cant income elasticity of hospital expenditures that is almost always less than 1. Our central
estimate is an income elasticity of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21). This estimate is reasonably
robust to a range of alternative speci￿cations.
Our central point estimate suggests that rising income did not contribute to the rise in
the health share of GDP between 1960 and 2005. Our 95 percent con￿dence interval￿ which
includes at its upper end an income elasticity of 1.1￿ suggests that we can reject a role of rising
income of explaining more than a very small part, 0.5 percentage points, of the 11 percentage
point increase in the health share of GDP over that time period. Although considerable caution
is warranted in extrapolating estimates from a particular source of variation, time period, and
part of the country to the overall impact of rising incomes in the post-war period, we provided
additional evidence suggesting that many of the most salient potential concerns with such
extrapolation are not likely to pose major threats to our conclusions.
While our ￿ndings suggest that the increase in income is unlikely to be a primary driver of
the increase in the health share of GDP, they do not provide an answer to the question of what
is behind this notable trend. There is general consensus that rapid progress in medical tech-
nologies is a (or ￿the￿ ) major driver of increasing health expenditures (e.g., Newhouse, 1992,
Fuchs, 1996, Cutler, 2002, Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2008), though presumably technologi-
cal progress itself is being spurred by other factors. Our analysis thus indirectly also suggests
that rising incomes are unlikely to be the major driver of medical innovations either. An inter-
esting possibility is that institutional factors, such as the spread of insurance coverage, have
not only directly encouraged increased spending but also induced the adoption and di⁄usion of
new medical technologies (Weisbrod 1991, Finkelstein 2004, Finkelstein 2007, Acemoglu and
Finkelstein, 2008). This channel of induced innovation could not only account for the increase
in the health share of GDP in the United States, but provided that technological advances in
the United States spread relatively rapidly to other advanced economies, it could also be a ma-
jor contributor to the similar trends experienced by other OECD countries. An investigation
of this possibility, as well as more general analyses of the determinants of technological change
in the health care sector, are important and interesting areas for further work.
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41Appendix A: Induced Innovation E⁄ects
In this Appendix, we present a simple model to illustrate why, given an income elasticity
of health expenditure less than one, any induced innovation e⁄ects in the health care sector
due to rising income are unlikely to be large. We ￿rst present a simple model incorporating
endogenous technology responses to changes in market size. To economize on space, the reader
is referred to Acemoglu (2002, 2007, 2009) or Acemoglu and Linn (2004) for the details (and
microfoundations for various assumptions imposed here for simplicity).
Consider an in￿nite-horizon, continuous-time economy with g = 1;:::;G goods. To commu-
nicate the basic ideas, we take expenditures on these goods as given, represented by [Eg (t)]
1
t=0
for good g (in terms of some numeraire). We also assume that all of these goods have unit price
elasticity (otherwise, we could not take these expenditures as given). We then ask how changes
in these expenditure levels a⁄ect the types of technologies developed by pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms.
These assumptions imply that at time t the demand for good g will be




where pg (t). Suppose, in particular, that each good can be supplied in di⁄erent qualities,
denoted by qg (t) 2 R+, and consumers will purchase whichever variety of the good has the
highest price-adjusted quality. That is, among varieties of good g, g1,...;gV , available in the
market, they will choose the one with highest qgv (t)=pgv (t). This implies that whichever ￿rm
has the highest quality variety for good g at time t will generate revenues equal to Eg (t).
Suppose also that all goods, regardless of quality, can be produced at marginal cost equal to 1
(in terms of the numeraire). This implies that the ￿rm with the highest price-adjusted quality
for good g at time t (presuming that there is a single such ￿rm) will make pro￿ts equal to




Innovation and technological progress are modeled as in the quality ladder models of Aghion
and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) (see also Acemoglu, 2009, for a textbook
treatment). Suppose that starting from leading-edge quality qg (t) at time t, R&D directed to
good g generates (stochastic) innovations for this good. An innovation creates a new leading-
edge quality ￿q (t), where ￿ > 1. There is free entry into R&D and each ￿rm has access to an
R&D technology that generates a ￿ ow rate ￿g of innovation for every dollar spent for research
on good g. So if R&D expenditure at time t for good g is zg (t), the ￿ ow rate of innovation is
￿gzg (t):
42Di⁄erences in ￿g￿ s introduce the possibility that technological progress is scienti￿cally more
di¢ cult for some goods than for others. A ￿rm that makes an innovation has a perpetual
patent on the good that it invents, and will be able to sell it until a better good comes to the
market.
Consider good g, where current quality is qg (t). Consumers will purchase from the highest
price-adjusted quality and, by de￿nition, the next best ￿rm must have quality qg (t)=￿ and
can price as low as its marginal cost, 1. This implies that the leading-edge producer must set
a limit price
pg (t) = ￿ for all g and t. (9)
Then (8) give the time t pro￿ts of the ￿rm with the leading-edge variety of good g, with quality
qg (t) as




Firms are forward-looking, and discount future pro￿ts at the interest rate r. We assume
that this interest rate is constant. The discounted value of pro￿ts for ￿rms can be expressed
by a standard dynamic programming recursion. Vg (t j qg), the value of a ￿rm that owns the
most advanced variety of good g with quality qg at time t, is
rVg (t j qg) ￿ _ Vg (t j qg) = ￿g (qg (t)) ￿ ￿gzg (t)Vg (t j qg); (11)
where ￿g (qg (t)) is the ￿ ow pro￿ts given by (10), and zg (t) is R&D e⁄ort at time t on this
line by other ￿rms. Throughout, we assume that the relevant transversality conditions hold
and discounted values are ￿nite. Moreover, because of the standard replacement e⁄ect ￿rst
emphasized by Arrow (1962), the ￿rm with the best technology does not undertake any R&D
itself (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Acemoglu, 2009). Intuitively, the value of
owning the best technology for good g, rVg (t j qg), is equal to the ￿ ow pro￿ts, ￿g (qg (t)), plus
the potential appreciation of the value, _ Vg (t j qg), and takes into account that at the ￿ ow rate
￿gzg (t) there will be a new innovation, causing the current ￿rm to lose its leading position and
to make zero pro￿ts thereafter.
Free entry into R&D for developing new technologies for each good implies that there will
be entry as long as additional R&D is pro￿table. Therefore, free entry requires the following
complementary slackness condition to hold:
if zg (t) > 0, then ￿gVg (t j qg) = 1 for all g and t (12)
(and if zg (t) = 0, ￿gVg (t j qg) ￿ 1 and there will be no innovation for this good at time t).
An equilibrium in this economy is given by sequences of prices pg (t)jg=1;::G that satisfy
(9), and R&D levels zg (t)jg=1;::g that satisfy (12) with Vg (￿) given by (11).
43An equilibrium is straightforward to characterize. The free entry condition must hold at
all t. Supposing that it holds as equality in some interval [t0;t00], we can di⁄erentiate this
equation with respect to time, which yields _ Vg (t j qg) = 0 for all g and t (as long as zg (t) > 0).
Substituting this equation and (12) into (11) yields the levels of R&D e⁄ort in the unique
equilibrium as
zg (t) = max
￿




for all g and t. (13)
Equation (13) highlights the market size e⁄ect in innovation: the greater is expenditures
on good g, Eg (t), the more pro￿table it is to be a supplier of that good, and consequently,
there will be greater research e⁄ort to acquire this position. In addition, a higher productivity
of R&D as captured by ￿g also increases R&D, and a higher interest rate reduces R&D since
current R&D expenditures are rewarded by future revenues.
Given equation (13), we can now ask how a rise in overall income in the economy will













. However, expenditures on some good will in-
crease by more, in particular, those that are ￿luxury goods￿will see their expenditures increase
by more. Equation (13) then implies that innovations will be tend to be directed towards those
goods.
To highlight the implications of this type of induced technological change for our pur-
poses, suppose that the economy consists of two goods, health care and the ￿rest￿ . Suppose
also that equation (13) leads to positive R&D for both groups of goods. Moreover, let us
parameterize expenditures on these two groups of goods as Ehealth (t) = ahealth (t)Y (t) and
Erest (t) = arest (t)Y (t), where Y (t) is total income (GDP). Our ESR-level estimates imply
that, without the induced technology responses, arest (t) > ahealth (t), so that with the rising
incomes Erest (t) increases more than Ehealth (t). Equation (13) then implies that zrest (t) will
increase (proportionately) by more than zhealth (t), or that zrest (t)=zhealth (t) will increase.
Importantly, this conclusion is independent of the values of the ￿g￿ s as long as they are such
that both zrest (t) > 0 and zhealth (t) > 0. This result is the basis of our argument that, given
the relationship between health care expenditures and income we observe at the ESR level,
national-level directed technological change is unlikely to signi￿cantly increase the responsive-
ness of health care expenditures to aggregate income changes.
Equation (13) also highlights the conditions under which this conclusion needs to be mod-
i￿ed. If it happens to be the case that zhealth (t) = 0 and zrest (t) > 0 to start with, then an
increase in Ehealth (t) that is proportionately less than that in Erest (t) may still have a dispro-
portionate e⁄ect on innovation in the health care sector by making zhealth (t) > 0. Intuitively,
44before the changes in expenditures, technological change in the health care sector would have
been unpro￿table, and as the market size passes a certain threshold (in this case equal to
￿￿1
g (￿ ￿ 1)
￿1 ￿r), innovation jumps up from zero to a positive level. While this is theoretically
possible, we believe that it is unlikely to be important in the context of the health care sector,
since as discussed earlier in the main text, throughout the 20th century technological change
in the health care sector was positive and in fact quite rapid (Cutler and Meara, 2003).
45Appendix B: Econometric Issues
In this Appendix, we discuss a number of econometric issues related to the correction for serial
correlation and dynamics.
Implementation of IV GLS
We now provided details of the implementation of the IV-GLS estimator used in subsection 5.3.
In particular, we use the following procedure for this estimation. First, we recover estimates of
the residuals (^ "jt) from the baseline IV speci￿cation. Then we use these residuals to estimate
the autocorrelation coe¢ cients. For example, when we estimate ESR-speci￿c autocorrelation
coe¢ cients, we run the following regression of ^ "jt on its lag (^ "j;t￿1) for each ESR to recover an
estimate of the ESR-speci￿c autocorrelation coe¢ cient, ^ ￿j:
^ "jt = ￿j^ "j;t￿1 + ￿jt
These autocorrelation coe¢ cients are used to create adjusted (LHS and RHS) variables as
follows:
~ xjt = xjt ￿ ^ ￿jxj;t￿1
~ yjt = yjt ￿ ^ ￿jyj;t￿1
Finally, to adjust for ESR-level heteroskedasticity, we run IV again using the adjusted
variables above to recover a new set of residuals (^ "0
jt) and then we create a weighting matrix
^ ￿ using these residuals:





















where I(￿) creates an identity matrix and diag(￿) creates a diagonal matrix from a vector.
Using this weighting matrix, the IV-GLS estimator is given as follows:






Performance of di⁄erent estimators with heterogeneous adjustment dynamics
We now describe results from a simple Monte Carlo study to investigate the performance
of various estimators under heterogeneous long-run adjustment dynamics. Our Monte Carlo
results suggest that heterogeneous adjustment dynamics may lead traditional ￿xed e⁄ects
instrumental variables (FE-IV) estimators to underestimate the true long-run e⁄ect. We show
that using 3-year averages can reduce this bias. Reassuringly, our 3-year average results are
46similar to our baseline results (see Table 10, column 7). The remainder of this section describes
the set of our Monte Carlo study and our results.
We de￿ne the following variables for our simulation:
zjt = N(0;1)
ajt = N(0;1)
xjt = N(0;1) + zjt + ajt
￿j = N(0;1)
"jt = ￿"j;t￿1 + ￿jt
yjt = xjt + ajt + ￿j + "jt
where j indexes one of the J panels and t indexes on of the T time periods within a panel.
N(0;1) represents an i.i.d. standard normal random variable, zjt represents a valid instrumen-
tal variable for xjt, ajt is the unobserved variable that induces a correlation between xjt and
the error term in the endogenous ￿xed e⁄ects regression of yjt on xjt, and ￿j is an unobserved
￿xed e⁄ect. "jt is the error term in the model which follows an AR(1) process (j￿j < 1). We
also experiment with serveral other ways to construct yjt:
yjt = xj;t￿1 + ajt + ￿j + "jt
yjt =
￿
xjt + ajt + ￿j + "jt if j < J=2





xjt + ajt + ￿j + "jt if j < J=3
xj;t￿1 + ajt + ￿j + "jt if J=3 ￿ j < 2J=3
xj;t￿2 + ajt + ￿j + "jt if j ￿ 2J=3
We experimented with the following estimators in in our Monte Carlo study:
1. (FE-IV) Fixed e⁄ects IV regression of yjt on xjt, instrumenting xjt by zjt
2. (FD-IV) First di⁄erences IV regression of (yjt ￿ yj;t￿1) on (xjt ￿ xj;t￿1), instrumenting
(xjt ￿ xj;t￿1) by (zjt ￿ zj;t￿1)
3. (FE-IV-LAG) Fixed e⁄ects IV regression of yjt on xj;t￿1, instrumenting xj;t￿1 by zj;t￿1
4. (FE-IV-3YR) Fixed e⁄ects IV regression of ~ yjs on ~ xjs instrumenting ~ xjs by ~ zjs (where
~ vjs denotes the three-year averages of vjt and s represents a three-year groups of years)
5. (FD-IV-3YR) First di⁄erences IV regression of (~ yjs ￿ ~ yj;s￿1) on (~ xjs ￿ ~ xj;s￿1), instru-
menting (~ xjs ￿ ~ xj;s￿1) by (~ zjs ￿ ~ zjs)
47Finally, we choose J = 10 and T = 30, and we experiment with three values of ￿
(0:1;0:5;0:9).
The results (based on 500 simulations) are given in Appendix Table A4. There are ￿ve
panels of results corresponding to each of the ￿ve estimators mentioned above. The resuls are
the mean of the estimates across each of the simulations and the standard deviation of the
parameter estimates (in parentheses underneath). The ￿rst panel reports the FE-IV results.
As would be expected, the standard deviation of the parameter estimates is larger when there
are higher amounts of serial correlation. The second panel reports FD-IV results, where (also
as expected) the standard deviation of the parameter estimates goes down as there is more
serial correlation. The third panel reports FE-IV-LAG results, and the last two columns report
the two sets of 3-year average results (FE-IV-3YR and FD-IV-3YR).
Each panel reports results for the same set of four models. The ￿rst row is the standard
model where all panels adjust instantly. All estimators except FE-IV-LAG perform very well
(the average of the parameter estimates is very close to the true value of 1.000). The second
row reports results using a model where all panels take one time period to adjust. For this
model the FE-IV and FD-IV results perform very poorly, while FE-IV-LAG unsurprisingly
performs optimally. Interestingly, FE-IV-3YR still performs reasonably well, though for all
degrees of serial correlation the estimates are roughly 2/3 of the true value.
The ￿nal two rows (rows 3 and 4) report results when there is heterogeneity in the adjust-
ment dynamics (where a random set of panels responds instantly and another random set of
panels does not respond instantly). For all estimators the results are attentuated away from
the true coe¢ cient, but the FE-IV-3YR estimator always performs best, even when there is
substantial serial correlation.
We conclude two things from this simulation exercise: (1) heterogeneous adjustment dy-
namics can lead standard estimators (FE-IV and FD-IV) to underestimate the true long-run
e⁄ect and (2) estimators using 3-year averages appear to be reasonably robust to a moderate
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Figure 1: Health Spending Trends
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Figure 2: Oil Price, 1950-2005
Note: This graph displays the annual average oil price, calculated from the monthly
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Figure 3a: Map of Large Oil Well Reserves by ESR
Note: This map displays the total amount of oil in large oil wells for each Economic Sub Region in
the South. Large oil wells are dened as having ever had more than 100 million barrels of oil. The
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Figure 3b: Large Oil Well Reserves by ESR
Note: This gure displays the cross-sectional distribution of oil reserves by Economic Sub Region
(ESR) among the ESRs containing large wells. Of the 99 ESRs in the South, 69 ESRs do not have
any large oil wells. This gure shows the amount of oil reserves (in billions of barrels) for the 30
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Figure 4b: Total Hospital Expenditures by ESR
Figure 4: Aggregate Income and Hospital Expenditure Data
Note: This gure contains histograms of the total income and total hospital expenditures by Eco-
nomic Sub Region (ESR). Income is measured using the payroll data from the County Business
Patterns (CBP), and the total hospital expenditures come from the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Surveys. Both variables are displayed in logs. The data displayed are for ESRs in




































Figure 5: Hospital Days by Age Bucket
Note: This chart displays the average annual number of hospital days for various age buckets. The






Oil and Gas Data Book Data
Oil Reserves (million barrels) 532.3 1596.1 3371.7 9124.3
County Business Patterns Data
Total Income (Payroll); ($millions) 2916.9 6066.7 18494.4 20751.0
Total Employment (millions) 0.21 0.35 1.32 1.13
AHA Hospital Data
Total Expenditures ($millions) 292.61 636.31 1854.22 2257.94
Hospital Payroll ($millions) 139.87 284.12 886.40 1011.38
Admissions (millions) 0.11 0.16 0.73 0.55
Inpatient Days (millions) 1.08 1.47 6.85 4.76
Beds (thousands) 4.15 5.65 26.29 19.06
Full-time Equivalents (thousands) 9.58 14.55 60.72 48.58
RN / (LPN + RN) 0.63 0.12 0.69 0.09
# of Technologies 46.98 18.10 48.37 19.53
# of Hospitals 24.67 26.57 156.43 126.71
Population (millions) 0.68 0.89 4.44 3.40
HUWP (millions) 0.60 0.84 3.88 3.02
BEA GSP Data   (all in $millions)
Total GSP 54559.5 60731.7
  (Industry-Specific GSPs)
Health Services 1639.9 2182.0
Amusement and Recreation Services 150.3 266.4
Hotels and Other Lodging 237.7 343.6
Legal Services 312.9 575.2
Other Services 624.5 995.6
Food 524.3 485.0
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Data   (all in $millions)
Total Health Care Expenditures 5923.8 6447.2
Hospital Expenditures 2641.1 2663.7
Physician and Other Services 1626.0 2065.4
Dental Services 303.3 330.7
Drugs and Other Medical Non-durables 654.7 685.4
Vision Products 106.2 130.8
Nursing Care 390.7 382.2
Other Health Services 201.8 425.2
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics
Notes:  Summary statistics in columns 1 and 2 are for the baseline sample of 99 Economic Sub Regions (ESRs) 
in the 16 Southern states between 1970 and 1990 (i.e. all statistics are ESR-year); columns 3 and 4 report 
summary statistics for the State-year data for the same baseline sample of 16 southern states between 1970 and 
1990.   Source for variables is given in italics. BEA and HCFA data are only available at state level. N = 2065 
at ESR-Year except for RN/(LPN+RN) which is 1576 and Inpatient Days which is 1967.  N = 326 at State-
Year except for HCFA data and except for RN/(LPN+RN) which is 251 and Inpatient Days which is 311.  Data 
on RNs and LPNs are only available in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980-1990.  Data on Inpatient Days 
are not available in 1979.  N = 236 at State-Year for HCFA data which are only available in 1972, 1976-1978, 
and 1980-1990.  HUWP is a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population. See text for more details.
State-year data ESR-year data
Current Population Reports and NHIS Data










Population (in millions) 0.687 0.521 0.113 0.155
Total Employment (in millions) 0.168 0.137 0.075 0.306
Hospital Expenditures (in $thousands) 0.059 0.050 0.072 0.356
Hospital Beds (in thousands) 4.671 3.940 0.094 0.184
Total Income (in $thousands) 0.989 0.778 0.077 0.298
p-value of F-test of joint significance 0.357
  (F-statistic = 1.12 for F(5,92))
Notes:  All results based on 1970 cross-section of the ESRs in the baseline sample (i.e. the 16 Southern 
states).  Column 3 reports the coeffient from a regression of Oil Reserves on the variable in the row header 
and a constant term; in these regressions in column 3, both dependent and independent variables are 
standardized to have standard deviation of 1.  Column 4 reports the associated p-value (based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). The final row of table reports results from a regression of Oil 
Reserves on all of the variables listed in table and a constant term.  N = 98 in the regressions reported in 
columns 3 and 4 because AHA data for Washington, DC are not available in 1970. N = 30 in column 1 and 
68 in column 2.
Table 1b: Comparing Economic Sub Regions in 1970 With Different Oil Reserves 
55(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Geographic level of 
analysis: State













Oil Reservesj × 12.900 15.542 5.252 7.648 6.421 1.545 9.245 2.564
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.980) (2.572) (1.491) (1.937) (1.756) (1.531) (2.271) (0.523)
   [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.003]    [0.001]    [0.002]    [0.329]    [0.001]    [0.000]
R
2 0.994 0.969 0.997 0.984 0.997 0.996 0.983 0.989
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 326
F-statistic 18.74 36.53 12.40 15.58 13.37 1.02 16.58 24.05
Notes:  Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (2) and (5) by OLS. Dependent variables are defined in column headings and 
are all in logs; in column 7 and 8 the dependent variable is income divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP). 
The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990.  Unit of observation is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year except in column 8 
where it is State-year.  All models include ESR (or state in column 8) and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary 
variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  
Table 2: First Stage
Economic Sub Region
56(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geographic level of analysis: State




OLS IV IV IV IV
log(Income)jt -0.027            0.723 0.801 0.665 0.550
(0.074)            (0.214) (0.155) (0.263) (0.230)
   [0.723]               [0.004]    [0.000]    [0.023]    [0.030]
Oil Reservesj ×            6.680                                            
  log(oil price)t -1            (2.048)                                            
              [0.005]                                            
R
2 0.973 0.973 0.968 0.989 0.970 0.992
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 326
Table 3: Hospital Expenditures
Notes:  Table reports results of estimating equations (1), (4) or (6) by OLS or IV as indicated. Dependent 
variable is log hospital expenditures. In columns 1, 2, 3, and 6, both hospital expenditures and income are 
divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs (see equations (4) 
through (6)).  In column 4 hospital expenditures and income are not adjusted before taking logs, and in column 5 
both hospital expenditures and income are divided by the total population before taking logs. The sample is all 
Southern states between 1970 and 1990.  Unit of observation is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year except in 
column 6 where it is a state-year.  All models include ESR (or state in column 6) and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses 
and p-values are in brackets.  
Economic Sub Region


















log(Income)jt 0.723 0.934 0.039 0.329 -0.430 -1.034 -0.698 -0.552 -0.132 -3.195 1.084
(0.214) (0.233) (0.222) (0.089) (0.193) (0.488) (0.455) (0.358) (0.221) (11.112) (2.566)
   [0.004]    [0.001]    [0.862]    [0.002]    [0.042]    [0.051]    [0.146]    [0.144]    [0.558] [0.170] [0.545]
R
2 0.968 0.958 0.893 0.868 0.788 0.884 0.871 0.981 0.945   
N 2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065 2065 849 262
Table 4: Other Hospital Outcomes
Notes: Columns 1 through 9 report IV estimates of equation (4) with the first stage given by equation (5).  Column 1 reproduces baseline results from column 3 in Table 3.  
Unit of observation is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year.  The baseline sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990.  Each column shows results for a different 
dependent variable, as indicated in the column heading. Dependent variables in columns 1-3 and 5-7 are in logs and are divided (before taking logs) by a hospital-utilization 
weighted measure of population (HUWP). Dependent variables in columns 8 and 9 are in logs but not adjusted by any population measure; dependent variable in column 4 is 
not adjusted by any population measure and is not in logs. Columns 10 and 11 report results from an instrumental variables estimator of the Cox proportional hazard model 
shown in equation (7). Dependent variable in columns 10 and 11 is an indicator variable for whether an at-risk ESR adopts the technology in that year and sample size 
reflects the number of ESRs "at risk" for adoption in each year. In column 10, there are 56 ESRs that have not adopted open-heart surgery technology by 1970 and 22 ESRs 
that have not adopted by 1990.  In column 11, there are 21 ESRs that have not adopted radioisotope therapy by 1972 (the first year data are available) and 8 ESRs that have 
not adopted by 1990.  Data for RNs and LPNs (column 4) only exist in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980-1990.  Data for in-patient days (column 6) do not exist in 
1979. All models include ESR and year fixed effects, except columns 10 and 11 which have region fixed effects and controls for total hospital beds and hospital expenditures 
in 1970.  In all columns income is divided by HUWP before taking logs. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over 
time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets; in columns 10 and 11 the standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped (clustered by state). 
58(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Regression:
First Stage 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil Reservesj × 3.626                                                                                        
  log(oil price)t -1 (0.776)                                                                                        
   [0.000]                                                                                        
log(Income)jt            0.055 0.067 0.179 0.622 0.248 1.187 -1.302 -0.359
           (0.077) (0.157) (0.152) (0.100) (0.120) (0.516) (0.321) (0.228)
              [0.484]    [0.675]    [0.257]    [0.000]    [0.057]    [0.036]    [0.001]    [0.137]
R
2 0.985 0.998 0.995 0.996 0.991 0.993 0.914 0.926 0.963
N 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
F-statistic 21.81                                                                                        
                      46.30% 24.73% 5.17% 11.33% 1.80% 7.02% 3.44%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil Reservesj × 3.162                                                                                        
  log(oil price)t -1 (0.586)                                                                                        
   [0.000]                                                                                        
log(Income)jt            0.098 0.139 0.365 0.650 0.307 0.748 -1.944 -0.953
           (0.167) (0.151) (0.186) (0.173) (0.112) (0.824) (0.968) (0.758)
              [0.558]    [0.361]    [0.056]    [0.000]    [0.009]    [0.368]    [0.050]    [0.214]
R
2 0.98 0.996 0.965 0.974 0.986 0.989 0.879 0.918 0.915
N 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 729
F-statistic 29.11                                                                                        
                      45.06% 25.04% 6.07% 10.40% 2.02% 8.57% 3.39%
Table 5: Hospital Spending Versus Overall Health Spending
Notes:  Table reports first stage results of estimating equation (5) by OLS in column 1; remaining columns report estimates of variants of 
estimating equation (4) by IV.  Unit of observation is a State-year in all columns.  Dependent variables are various measures of health care 
expenditures from the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA).  HCFA data are available in 1972, 1976 - 1978, and 1980-1990.  All 
dependent variables and income are in logs and divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP).  In all columns 
income is divided by HUWP before taking logs.  Sample is Southern states in Panel A and All U.S. (except Alaska and Virginia) in Panel B.  
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in 
brackets.  
Share of Total 
Health Care Exp.
Panel A: Southern States Only
Panel B: All U.S.
Share of Total 
Health Care Exp.
59(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Income)jt 0.550 0.451 0.740 0.568
(0.230) (0.160) (0.359) (0.263)
   [0.030]    [0.013]    [0.045]    [0.036]
R
2 0.992 0.993 0.981 0.982
N 326 326 1015 1015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Reservesj × 2.564 3.128 2.220 2.895
  log(oil price)t -1 (0.523) (0.851) (0.443) (0.682)
   [0.000]    [0.002]    [0.000]    [0.000]
R
2 0.989 0.990 0.985 0.983
N 326 326 1015 1015
F-statistic 24.05 13.50 25.10 18.05
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income definition Payroll GSP Payroll GSP
Geographic sample South South USA USA
Table 6: Labor Income vs. All Income
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
Notes:  Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (4) by IV in Panel A 
and equation (5) by OLS in Panel B. Unit of observation is a State-year in all columns. 
In all specifications income and hospital expenditures are divided by hospital-utilization 
weighted measure of population (HUWP) and then logged.  Bottom rows define the 
specification variants; these are the definition of income (Payroll as in the baseline 
specification or Gross State Product (GSP)) and the geographic sample (South or all 
US). In all columns the years of analysis are 1970 - 1990. The sample is all Southern 
states between 1970 and 1990 in columns 1 and 2; columns 3 and 4 expand sample to 
all US (except Alaska and Virginia).  Column 1 reproduces results from column 6 in 
Table 3.   All regressions include state and year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted 
to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in 
parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
Specification 








log(Income)jt 0.900 0.835 1.635 1.375 -0.009 -0.048
(0.385) (0.319) (0.317) (0.387) (0.416) (0.181)
   [0.034]    [0.019]    [0.000]    [0.003]    [0.984]    [0.793]
R
2 0.984 0.984 0.991 0.989 0.965 0.996
N 326 326 326 308 324 326
log(Income)jt 1.080 0.940 1.749 1.400 0.255 0.207
(0.384) (0.397) (0.291) (0.270) (0.356) (0.412)
   [0.007]    [0.022]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.477]    [0.617]
R
2 0.975 0.978 0.988 0.984 0.977 0.994
N 1013 1015 1015 989 1013 1015
Industry-specific Gross State Product
Table 7: Income Elasticity of Other  Goods
Notes:  Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (4) by IV. Dependent variables 
are given in column headings. All dependent variables are in logs, and all dependent variables and 
income are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before 
taking logs. The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990 in Panel A and all US states 
(except Alaska and Virginia) between 1970 and 1990 in Panel B.  Unit of analysis is a state-year.  
All columns include state and year fixed effects.  Dependent variable is the Gross State Product for 
various industries, as indicated by column headings.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in 
brackets.  
Panel A: Southern States Only
Panel B: All U.S.








Oil Reservesj ×                       6.680 10.567
  log(oil price)t -1                       (2.099) (7.511)
                         [0.006]    [0.180]
log(Income)jt 0.725 0.833                      
(0.216) (0.369)                      
   [0.005]    [0.040]                      
log(Income)jt ×            -0.066                      
  log(Income)j,t=1970            (0.143)                      
              [0.652]                      
{ Oil Reservesj ×                                  -487.728
  log(oil price)t -1 }
2                                  (717.177)
                                    [0.507]
R
2 0.967 0.965 0.973 0.973
N 2054 2054 2065 2065
 -1 standard deviation 0.725 0.862 6.680 11.855
Marginal Effect at Mean 0.725 0.833 6.680 10.567
 +1 standard deviation 0.725 0.804 6.680 9.278
Table 8: Decomposition and Tests for Nonlinear Effects
Notes:   Table reports IV estimates of variants of equation (4) in columns 1 and 2 and OLS 
estimates of a variant of equation (6) in columns 3 and 4.  The unit of anlaysis is an 
Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year, and the regressions include ESR fixed effects and year 
fixed effects.  All dependent variables are in logs.  In all columns hospital expenditures and 
income are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) 
before taking logs. The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990.  Note that 
the results in columns 1 and 3 differ slightly from baseline results in Table 3 because the 
sample does not include Washington, DC (DC is dropped because there is no data for DC 
in the 1970s).  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance 
matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
62(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Income)jt 0.723 0.700 0.804 N/A 0.853
(0.214) (0.368) (0.633) (0.439)
   [0.004]    [0.106]    [0.210]    [0.071]
R
2 0.968 0.967 0.956 0.970
N 2065 1070 4915 3547
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Oil Reservesj × 9.245 6.237 7.094 1.481 7.966
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.271) (1.655) (2.375) (1.882) (1.930)
   [0.001]    [0.009]    [0.004]    [0.443]    [0.001]
R
2 0.983 0.985 0.982 0.984 0.986
N 2065 1070 4915 3547 3547
F-statistic 16.58 14.21 8.92 0.62 17.04
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years 1970-1990 1970-1990 1970-1990 1970-2005 1970-2005




All US South South
State-specific time trends NNNNY
Panel A: IV Results
Notes:  Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (4) by IV in Panel A and equation 
(5) by OLS in Panel B. All dependent variables and income are in logs and divided by a hospital-
utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs.  Unit of analysis is an 
Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year in all columns, and all columns include ESR fixed effects and 
year fixed effects.  Bottom rows define the specification variants. The baseline sample is all 
Southern states between 1970 and 1990.  Column 1 reproduces baseline results from column 7 in 
Table 2 and column 3 in Table 3.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  Because 
there is no statistically significant first stage in column 4, the IV results are not reported.  
Table 9: Heterogeneity Across Geography and Time
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
Specification





















Oil Reservesj × 9.245 6.680            7.621 6.050                      
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.271) (2.099)            (2.643) (2.628)                      
   [0.001]    [0.006]               [0.011]    [0.036]                      
log(Income)jt                       0.723                       0.794 0.826
                      (0.214)                       (0.411) (0.231)
                         [0.004]                          [0.073]    [0.003]
R
2 0.983 0.973 0.968 0.986 0.986 0.981 0.976
N 2065 2065 2065 296 296 296 690
F-statistic 16.577                       8.318                                 
Table 10: Short-run versus Long-run Effects
Notes:  Table reports results of estimating equations (4), (5) or (6) by OLS or IV as indicated. All dependent variables are in logs. Unit of 
analysis is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-Year, and all columns include ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects. In all columns income 
and hospital expenditures are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. Columns 1 
through 3 are the baseline sample of all Southern states between 1970 and 1990; in columns 4 through 6, only observations from 1970, 
1980, and 1990 are included.  Column 7 uses 3-year averages of all variables (see Appendix B for more details).  Standard errors, adjusted 
to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  












IV IV IV IV IV RF RF
log(Income)jt 0.723 0.992 0.697 0.352 0.131                      
(0.214) (0.306) (0.283) (0.192) (0.118)                      
   [0.004]    [0.005]    [0.027]    [0.088]    [0.286]                      
Oil Reservesj ×                                                        4.980 -3.107
  log(oil price)t -1                                                        (1.656) (4.044)
                                                          [0.009]    [0.455]
Oil Reservesj ×            -11.322                                                       
  log(oil price)t+5            (7.830)                                                       
              [0.169]                                                       
R
2 0.968 0.964 0.970 0.972 0.976 0.966 0.980
N 2065 2065 2054 2065 2065 1471 1487
                                                                        
Oil Reservesj × 9.245 8.186 8.219 11.722 13.774 14.172
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.271) (2.157) (2.387) (3.004) (3.951) (3.481)
   [0.001]    [0.002]    [0.004]    [0.001]    [0.003]    [0.001]
Oil Reservesj ×            4.821                                            
  log(oil price)t+5            (3.291)                                            
              [0.164]                                            
R
2 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.985 0.986
N 2065 2065 2054 2065 2065 1471
F-statistic 16.577 14.396 11.853 15.222 12.154 16.571
Table 11: Robustness of Identifying Assumption
Panel A: IV and Reduced Form OLS Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Income
Panel B: First Stage Results
Notes:  Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (4) by IV in Panel A, except in columns 6 and 7 
which show variants of equation (6) estimated by OLS in Panel A; table reports results from estimating variants of 
equation (5) by OLS in Panel B. All dependent variables are in logs.  In all columns hospital expenditures and 
income are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. Unit of 
observation is an Economic Sub Region (ESR) - year, and all columns include ESR and year fixed effects.  In 
columns 1 through 5 the sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990. Column 1 reproduces baseline 
results (see column 7 of Table 2 and column 3 of Table 3).  Column 2 includes a 5-year lead of the instrument as a 
control variable.  Column 3 includes several additional interaction terms as control variables in a "horse race"; the 
interaction terms are the log oil price interacted with each of the following variables: hospital expenditures in 
1969, hospital beds in 1969, population in 1970, wage bill in 1970, employment in 1970.  Column 4 adds region-
specific linear time trends for the three Census regions in the South.  Column 5 includes state-specific linear time 
trends for the 16 Southern states.  Column 6 produces the first stage and reduced form results for 1970 to 1984 as 
comparison to the falsification test in column 7, which "grafts" the same oil price series in 1970 to 1984 onto the 
hospital data in 1955 to 1969. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for 
each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.   
65(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Income)jt 0.723 0.491 0.640 0.632 1.095 0.860
(0.214) (0.145) (0.194) (0.205) (0.670) (0.870)
   [0.004]    [0.004]    [0.005]    [0.008]    [0.123]    [0.339]
R
2 0.968 0.971 0.969 0.970 0.962 0.966
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil Reservesj × 9.245                                                       
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.216)                                                       
   [0.001]                                                       
Oil Reservesj ×            0.886                                            
  oil pricet -1            (0.200)                                            
              [0.000]                                            
Oil Reservesj ×                       10.080                                 
  log(oil price)t                       (2.467)                                 
                         [0.001]                                 
max(Oil Reserves,                                  12.646                      
         95th percentile) ×                                  (2.523)                      
  log(oil price)t -1                                     [0.000]                      
1{Oil Reserves > 0} ×                                             0.041           
  log(oil price)t -1                                             (0.014)           
                                               [0.012]           
1{Oil Reserves > 0} ×                                                        0.808
  Mining share of labor force in 1970 ×                                                        (0.240)
  log(oil price)t -1                                                           [0.004]
R
2 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.983
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065
F-statistic 17.41 19.71 16.69 25.12 8.22 11.36
Notes:  Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (4) by IV in Panel A and equation (5) by 
OLS in Panel B.  The specifications vary in their definition of the instrument, which is given in the left-
hand column of Panel B.  Unit of analysis is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year.  All dependent 
variables are in logs.  In all columns hospital expenditures and income are divided by a hospital-
utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. The sample is ESRs in Southern 
states between 1970 and 1990.  Column 1 reproduces baseline results (see column 7 of Table 2 and 
column 3 of Table 3). 1(Oil Reserves > 0) is an indicator variable for whether the ESR has any large oil 
wells.  All columns include ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow 
for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in 
brackets.  
Table 12: Alternative Specifications of Instrument
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
66(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline


















log(Income)jt 0.697 0.963 1.111 0.724 0.770 0.493 0.120
  (A) (0.216) (0.505) (0.681) (0.263) (0.287) (0.134) (0.067)
   [0.006]    [0.057]    [0.103]    [0.006]    [0.007]    [0.002]    [0.075]
log(Total Hospital Exp.)t -1                                                        0.428 0.154
  (B)                                                        (0.088) (0.047)
                                                          [0.000]    [0.001]
Implied long-run effect 0.859 0.142
  (A/(1-B)) (0.213) (0.080)
   [0.001]    [0.077]
N 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 1966 1966
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures





Notes:  Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (4) by IV.  The sample is all Southern states 
between 1970 and 1990.  Unit of observation is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year.  All specifications are at 
the Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year level and include ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects.  In all 
columns, income and hospital expenditures are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population 
(HUWP) before taking logs. For columns 1 through 5, the baseline sample is modified to only include the 96 (of 
99) ESRs with data for all 21 years between 1970 and 1990.  Column 1 produces baseline IV results with this 
modified sample.  Columns 2 through 5 report IV-GLS results.  In column 2, ρ1 is estimated to be 0.585.  In 
column 3, ρ1 is estimated to be 0.508 and ρ2 is estimated to be 0.127.  In column 4, ρ1 is estimated separately by 
state; estimated values of ρ1 range from 0.155 to 0.887 with mean 0.604 and s.d. 0.240.  In column 5, ρ1 and ρ2 
are estimated separately by state; estimated values of ρ1 range from 0.118 to 0.747 with mean 0.487 and s.d. 
0.200, and estimated values of ρ2 range from 0.041 to .341 with mean 0.192 and s.d. 0.083.  Column 6 includes 
a lagged dependent variable as a control.  Column 7 uses the Arellano-Bond GMM dyamic panel estimator.  In 
columns 6 and 7 the standard error on the implied long-run effect is estimated using the delta method. 
67(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(oil price)t -1 0.034 0.005 0.014 0.010 -0.090 -0.156 -0.151 -0.175
(0.054) (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) (0.089) (0.093) (0.101) (0.107)
   [0.537]    [0.927]    [0.816]    [0.880]    [0.315]    [0.098]    [0.141]    [0.107]
log(oil price)t -1 - log(oil price)t -2            0.249 0.254 0.264            0.318 0.319 0.351
           (0.158) (0.160) (0.167)            (0.156) (0.159) (0.166)
              [0.120]    [0.119]    [0.121]               [0.046]    [0.050]    [0.041]
log(oil price)t -2 - log(oil price)t -3                       -0.121 -0.123                       -0.038 -0.034
                      (0.166) (0.170)                       (0.167) (0.169)
                         [0.469]    [0.474]                          [0.819]    [0.840]
log(oil price)t -3 - log(oil price)t -4                                  0.047                                  0.125
                                 (0.172)                                  (0.170)
                                    [0.786]                                     [0.467]
t                                             0.111 0.142 0.141 0.157
                                            (0.064) (0.065) (0.070) (0.075)
                                               [0.088]    [0.035]    [0.050]    [0.040]
N 5 55 45 35 25 55 45 35 2
Dickey-Fuller test statistic 0.621 0.092 0.234 0.151 -1.014 -1.686 -1.498 -1.642
Approximate p-value 0.988 0.966 0.974 0.969 0.942 0.757 0.830 0.776
Appendix Table A1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Notes:  Table based on annual data on oil prices from 1950 to 2005.  Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  
Dependent Variable: log(oil price)t - log(oil price)t -1





Emergency Department 1970 1990 21 0.998
Histopathology Services 1970 1990 21 0.964
Home care Program / Department 1970 1990 21 0.701
Hospital Auxiliary 1970 1990 21 0.993
Inhalation Therapy Department (Respiratory) 1970 1990 21 0.993
Occupational Therapy 1970 1990 21 0.852
Physical Therapy Department 1970 1990 21 0.993
Psychiatric Partial Hospitalization Program 1970 1990 21 0.727
X-Ray Therapy 1970 1990 21 0.873
Blood Bank 1970 1990 20 0.993
Open Heart Surgery Facilities 1970 1990 20 0.528
Psychiatric Emergency Services (Outpatient) 1970 1990 20 0.788
Psychiatric Emergency Services 1970 1990 19 0.887
Rehabilitation Outpatient Unit 1970 1990 19 0.764
Organized Outpatient Department 1970 1988 18 0.940
Social Work Department 1970 1989 17 0.966
Cardiac Intensive Care 1970 1985 16 0.970
Family Planning Service 1970 1985 16 0.630
Psychiatric Foster And/Or Home Care 1970 1986 16 0.393
Self Care Unit 1970 1985 16 0.503
Premature Nursery 1970 1985 15 0.943
Rehabilitation Inpatient Unit 1970 1985 15 0.592
Postoperative Recovery Room 1970 1982 13 0.993
Electroencephalography 1970 1981 12 0.921
Hemodialysis / Renal Dialysis (Impatient)  1970 1981 12 0.682
Hemodialysis / Renal Dialysis (Outpatient) 1970 1981 12 0.675
Organ Bank 1970 1981 12 0.337
Pharmacy with FT Registered Pharmacist 1970 1981 12 0.974
Pharmacy with PT Registered Pharmacist 1970 1981 12 0.942
Psychiatric Inpatient Unit 1970 1980 11 0.750
Intensive Care Unit (Mixed) 1970 1979 10 0.973
Cobalt and Radium Therapy 1970 1978 9 0.669
Radium Therapy 1970 1978 9 0.837
Cobalt Therapy 1970 1977 8 0.693
Extended Care Unit 1970 1974 5 0.810
Basic Emergency Department 1970 1970 1 0.975
Major Emergency Department 1970 1970 1 0.743
Provisional Emergency Unit 1970 1970 1 0.962
Radioisoptope Facility 1970 1970 1 0.852
Genetic Counseling Service 1971 1990 20 0.441
Radioisoptope Facility (Diagnostic) 1971 1990 20 0.967
Radioisoptope Facility (Therapeutic) 1971 1990 20 0.836
Volunteer Services Department 1971 1990 20 0.956
Psychiatric Consultation and Education 1971 1986 16 0.799
Burn Care 1971 1985 15 0.472
Speech Therapist Services / Pathology 1972 1990 19 0.877
Clinical Psychologist Services 1972 1986 15 0.847
Dental Services 1972 1985 14 0.968
Appendix Table A2: Hospital Technologies
69Podiatrist Services 1972 1985 13 0.796
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 1975 1990 16 0.783
Alcohol / Chemical Dependency (Outpatient) 1975 1990 15 0.742
Skilled Nursing or Long Term Care Unit 1975 1985 11 0.852
Alcohol / Chemical Dependency (Impatient) 1975 1985 10 0.723
Neonatal Intensive Care 1976 1985 10 0.743
Pediatric Unit (Impatient) 1977 1978 2 0.951
Patient Representative Services 1978 1990 13 0.958
Abortion Service (Impatient) 1978 1981 4 0.794
Abortion Service (Outpatient) 1978 1981 3 0.638
Radioactive Implants 1979 1990 12 0.811
Megavoltage Radiation Therapy 1979 1990 11 0.781
Computerized Tomography Scanner (Head or Body) 1979 1990 10 0.859
Pediatric Intensive Care 1979 1985 7 0.773
Cardiac Catheterization 1980 1990 11 0.722
Hospice 1980 1990 11 0.715
Recreational Therapy 1980 1990 11 0.869
Ultrasound Facility (Diagnostic) 1980 1990 11 0.976
Kidney Transplant 1980 1990 7 0.327
Organ Transplant (Other than Kidney) 1980 1990 7 0.377
Chaplaincy Services 1980 1985 6 0.987
Electrocardiography 1980 1985 6 1.000
Intermediate Care for Mentally Retarded 1980 1985 6 0.439
Intravenous Admixture Services 1980 1985 6 0.993
Medical/Surgical Acute Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Medical/Surgical Intensive Care 1980 1985 6 0.998
Newborn Nursery 1980 1985 6 1.000
Obstetrical Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Other Long-Term Care / Intermediate Care Facility 1980 1985 6 0.838
Pediatric Acute Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Pharmacy Unit Dose System 1980 1985 6 0.990
Psychiatric Acute Care 1980 1985 6 0.953
Psychiatric Long Term Care 1980 1985 6 0.568
General Surgical Services 1980 1985 5 1.000
General Laboratory Services 1980 1985 4 1.000
Health Science Library 1980 1990 3 0.968
Psychiatric Intensive Care 1980 1982 3 0.679
Ambulance Services 1980 1981 2 0.930
Anesthesia Service 1980 1981 2 1.000
Autopsy Services 1980 1981 2 0.989
C.T. Scanner (Body Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.761
C.T. Scanner (Head Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.570
Cancer/Tumor 1980 1981 2 0.894
Electromyography 1980 1981 2 0.826
Hemodialysis (Home Care/ Mobile Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.464
NeuroSurgery 1980 1981 2 0.769
Physical Rehabilitation 1980 1982 2 0.856
Pulmonary Function Laboratory 1980 1981 2 0.987
Toxicology 1980 1981 2 0.983
Intravenous Therapy 1980 1980 1 0.886
Medical/Surgical Acute Care (Inpatient) 1980 1980 1 0.335
Rehabilitation 1980 1980 1 0.953
70Residential Care 1980 1980 1 0.547
Residential Care (Inpatient) 1980 1980 1 0.280
Day Hospital 1981 1987 7 0.822
Pediatric Psychiatric Services 1981 1986 6 0.777
Health Promotion 1981 1985 5 0.964
Optometric Services 1981 1985 5 0.857
Other Special Care 1981 1985 5 0.877
Sheltered Care 1981 1985 5 0.419
Ambulator Surgical Services 1981 1981 1 1.000
Podiatrist Services (Inpatient) 1981 1981 1 0.873
Podiatrist Services (Outpatient) 1981 1981 1 0.835
Hemodialysis Services 1982 1990 9 0.850
Outpatient Surgery 1982 1990 8 1.000
Abortion Services 1982 1985 4 0.825
Pharmacy Services 1982 1985 4 1.000
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment Services 1983 1990 8 0.805
Nuclear MRI Facility 1983 1990 8 0.542
Psychiatric Liaison Services 1983 1990 8 0.819
Trauma Center 1984 1990 7 0.751
Alcohol / Chemical Acute Care (Inpatient) 1984 1984 1 0.903
Alcohol / Chemical Subacute Care (Inpatient) 1984 1984 1 0.852
Birthing Room 1985 1990 6 0.970
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter 1985 1990 6 0.395
X-Ray (Diagnostic) 1985 1989 5 0.999
Unknown Technology 1985 1985 1 0.678
Adult Day Care 1986 1990 5 0.567
Community Health Promotion 1986 1990 5 0.984
Fertility Counseling 1986 1990 5 0.608
Fitness Center 1986 1990 5 0.746
Geriatric Acute-Care Unit 1986 1990 5 0.754
Occupational Health Services 1986 1990 5 0.869
Patient Education 1986 1990 5 0.992
Respite Care 1986 1990 5 0.803
Sports Medicine Clinic / Service 1986 1990 5 0.775
Sterilization 1986 1990 5 0.945
Women's Center 1986 1990 5 0.762
Worksite Health Promotion 1986 1990 5 0.959
Organ Transplant (Including Kidney) 1986 1989 4 0.467
AIDS Services 1986 1987 2 0.926
Continuing Care Case Management 1986 1987 2 0.773
Contraceptive Care 1986 1987 2 0.646
Genetic Counseling Screening 1986 1987 2 0.532
Satellite Geriatric Clinics 1986 1987 2 0.278
Child Adolescent Psychiatric Services 1987 1990 4 0.872
Geriatric Psychiatric Services 1987 1990 4 0.839
Psychiatric Education 1987 1990 4 0.887
AIDS (Outpatient) 1988 1990 3 0.414
AIDS General Inpatient Care 1988 1990 3 0.980
AIDS/ARC Unit 1988 1990 3 0.247
AIDS/HIV Testing 1988 1990 3 0.969
Alzheimer's Diagnostic Assessment Services 1988 1990 3 0.596
Emergency Response for Elderly 1988 1990 3 0.932
71Geriatic Clinic 1988 1990 3 0.496
In Vitro Fertilization 1988 1990 3 0.379
Medicare Certified Distinct Part Skilled Nursing Unit 1988 1990 3 0.886
Organized Social Work Services 1988 1990 3 0.989
Other Skilled Nursing Care 1988 1990 3 0.891
Senior Membership Program 1988 1990 3 0.737
Angioplasty 1989 1990 2 0.708
Arthritis Treatment Center 1989 1990 2 0.485
Emergency Social Work Services 1989 1990 2 0.911
Freestanding Outpatient Center 1989 1990 2 0.686
Hospital Based Outpatient Care Center 1989 1990 2 0.998
Orthopedic Surgery 1989 1990 2 0.972
Outpatient Social Work Services 1989 1990 2 0.939
Bone Marrow Transplant 1990 1990 1 0.301
Cardiac Rehabilitation 1990 1990 1 0.924
Non-Invasive Cardiac Assessment 1990 1990 1 0.970
Positron Emission Tomography Scanner 1990 1990 1 0.267
Single Photo Emission Computed Tomography 1990 1990 1 0.754
Stereotactic Radiosurgery 1990 1990 1 0.415
Tissue Transplant 1990 1990 1 0.432
Notes: This table lists the 172 unique technologies from the AHA annual surveys between 1970 and 1990.  For each 
technology, this table reports the first year the technology appears, the last year the technology appears, and the 


































log(Income)jt 0.723 0.702 0.725 0.695 0.725 0.694 0.838 0.714 0.706 0.655 0.782 0.677 0.823 0.764 0.680 0.461 0.750
(0.214) (0.226) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.219) (0.183) (0.212) (0.272) (0.215) (0.214) (0.235) (0.184) (0.223) (0.222) (0.695) (0.248)
   [0.004]   [0.008]   [0.005]   [0.006]   [0.005]   [0.007]   [0.000]   [0.005]   [0.021]   [0.009]   [0.003]   [0.012]   [0.001]   [0.004]   [0.009]   [0.518]   [0.009]
R
2 0.968 0.969 0.967 0.969 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.969 0.970 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.969 0.968 0.974 0.969
N 2065 1877 1918 2044 2054 2002 1900 1897 1939 1981 1939 1918 1897 1939 1918 1813 1939

































Oil Reservesj × 9.245 9.312 9.386 9.182 9.205 9.236 9.347 9.874 8.997 9.007 9.349 8.660 8.892 9.051 9.164 21.641 8.236
  log(oil price)t -1 (2.216) (2.375) (2.303) (2.222) (2.215) (2.285) (2.356) (2.363) (2.015) (2.221) (2.303) (2.127) (1.678) (2.265) (2.311) (4.879) (1.831)
   [0.001]   [0.002]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]
R
2 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.984 0.984
N 2065 1877 1918 2044 2054 2002 1900 1897 1939 1981 1939 1918 1897 1939 1918 1813 1939
F-statistic 17.41 15.37 16.61 17.08 17.26 16.33 15.73 17.45 19.93 16.45 16.48 16.58 28.09 15.97 15.73 19.67 20.24
Notes: Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (4) by IV in Panel A and equation (5) by OLS in Panel B. In all specifications income and hospital expenditures are 
divided by hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) and then logged.  First column shows results from our baseline sample of all Southern states from 1970 - 1990 
(see column 7 of Table 2 and column 3 of Table 3).  Subsequent columns show the results when the state specified in the column heading is omitted from the analysis. Unit of observation 
is an Economic Sub Region (ESR)-year; all regressions include ESR and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state 
over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.  
Appendix Table A3: Results Leaving Out Each State in Census South
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Total Hospital Expenditures
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Income
73ρ=0.1 ρ=0.3 ρ=0.9 ρ=0.1 ρ=0.3 ρ=0.9 ρ=0.1 ρ=0.3 ρ=0.9 ρ=0.1 ρ=0.3 ρ=0.9 ρ=0.1 ρ=0.3 ρ=0.9
y jt = x jt+a jt+δ j+ε jt 1.008 1.009 1.012 1.010 1.009 1.009 -0.041 -0.038 -0.033 1.020 1.026 1.032 1.029 1.032 1.034
(0.094) (0.097) (0.127) (0.111) (0.102) (0.095) (0.111) (0.117) (0.141) (0.181) (0.220) (0.352) (0.228) (0.243) (0.245)
y jt = x j,t-1+a jt+δ j+ε jt -0.033 -0.031 -0.029 -0.490 -0.491 -0.491 0.993 0.996 1.001 0.626 0.632 0.638 0.496 0.499 0.501
(0.138) (0.143) (0.158) (0.127) (0.120) (0.115) (0.089) (0.095) (0.124) (0.228) (0.260) (0.378) (0.291) (0.310) (0.324)
y jt = x j,t+a jt+δ j+ε jt     0.482 0.484 0.486 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.479 0.482 0.486 0.810 0.816 0.821 0.743 0.746 0.748
 or    x j,t-1+a jt+δ j+ε jt      (0.135) (0.139) (0.159) (0.155) (0.149) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) (0.166) (0.229) (0.258) (0.371) (0.294) (0.312) (0.322)
y jt = x jt+a jt+δ j+ε jt     0.307 0.309 0.311 0.161 0.161 0.160 0.309 0.311 0.316 0.626 0.632 0.637 0.480 0.483 0.486
 or    x j,t-1+a jt+δ j+ε jt  (0.139) (0.144) (0.163) (0.153) (0.149) (0.146) (0.147) (0.151) (0.168) (0.257) (0.284) (0.388) (0.313) (0.330) (0.340)
 or    x j,t-2+a jt+δ j+ε jt
Notes: This table reports results from the Monte Carlo study described in Appendix B.  Each cell displays the mean of the parameter estimates from 500 simulations; standard deviation of 
parameter estimates is reported below in parentheses.
Appendix Table A4: Monte Carlo Simulation Results
FE-IV FD-IV FE-IV-LAG FE-IV-3YR FD-IV-3YR
74